Facing Mecca

COMMENTARY:

by URI AVNERY

Since Saudi Arabia is the main ally of the US in the Arab world, the king has put the Palestinian issue firmly on the table of the Oval Office.

Must A Native-American recognize the right of the United States of America to exist?

Interesting question. The USA was established by Europeans who invaded a continent that did not belong to them, eradicated most of the indigenous population (the "Red Indians") in a prolonged campaign of genocide, and exploited the labor of millions of slaves who had been brutally torn from their lives in Africa. Not to mention what is going on today. Must a Native-American—or indeed anybody at all—recognize the right of such a state to exist?

But nobody raises the question. The United States does not give a damn if anybody recognizes its right to exist or not. It does not demand this from the countries with which it maintains relations.

Why? Because this is a ridiculous demand to start with.

OK, the United States is older than the State of Israel, as well as bigger and more powerful. But countries that are not super-powers do not demand this either. India, for example, is not expected to recognize Pakistan's "right to exist," in spite of the fact that Pakistan was established at the same time as Israel, and—like Israel—on an ethnic/religious basis.

So why is Hamas required to "recognize Israel's right to exist"?

When a state "recognizes" another state, it is a formal recognition, the acknowledgement of an existing fact. It does not imply approval. The Soviet Union was not required to recognize the existence of the USA as a capitalist state. On the contrary, Nikita Khrushchev promised in 1956 to "bury" it. The US certainly did not dream of recognizing at any time the right of the Soviet Union to exist as a communist state.

So why is this weird demand addressed to the Palestinians? Why must they recognize the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish State?

I am an Israeli patriot, and I do not feel that I need anybody's recognition of the right of my state to exist. If somebody is ready to make peace with me, within borders and on conditions agreed upon in negotiations, that is quite enough for me. I am prepared to leave the history, ideology and theology of the matter to the theologians, ideologues and historians.

Perhaps after 60 years of the existence of Israel, and after we have become a regional power, we are still so unsure of ourselves that we crave for constant assurance of our right to exist—and of all people, from those that we have been oppressing for the last 40 years. Perhaps it is the mentality of the Ghetto that is still so deeply ingrained in us.

But the demand addressed now to the Palestinian Unity Government is far from sincere. It has an ulterior political aim, indeed two: (a) to convince the international community not to recognize the Palestinian government that is about to be set up, and (b) to justify the refusal of the Israeli government to enter into peace negotiations with it.

The British call this a "red herring"—a smelly fish that a fugitive drags across the path in order to put the pursuing dogs off the trail.

When I was young, Jewish people in Palestine used to talk about our secret weapon: the Arab refusal. Every time somebody proposed some peace plan, we relied on the Arab side to say "no." True, the Zionist leadership was against any compromise that would have frozen the existing situation and halted the momentum of the Zionist enterprise of expansion and settlement. But the Zionist leaders used to say "yes" and "we extend our hand for peace"—and rely on the Arabs to scuttle the proposal.

That was successful for a hundred years, until Yasser Arafat changed the rules, recognized Israel and signed the Oslo Accords, which stipulated that the negotiations for the final borders between Israel and Palestine must be concluded not later than 1999. To this very day, those negotiations have not even started. Successive Israeli governments have prevented it because they were not ready under any circumstances to fix final borders. (The 2000 Camp David meeting was not a real negotiation—Ehud Barak convened it without any preparation, dictated his terms to the Palestinians and broke the dialogue off when they were refused.)

After the death of Arafat, the refusal became more and more difficult. Arafat was always described as a terrorist, cheat and liar. But Mahmoud Abbas was accepted by everybody as an honest person, who truly wanted to achieve peace. Yet Ariel Sharon succeeded in avoiding any negotiations with him. The "Unilateral Separation" served this end. President Bush supported him with both hands.

Well, Sharon suffered his stroke, and Ehud Olmert took his place. And then something happened that caused great joy in Jerusalem: the Palestinians elected Hamas.

How wonderful! After all, both the US and Europe have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization! Hamas is a part of the Shiite Axis of Evil! (They are not Shiites, but who cares!) Hamas does not recognize Israel! Hamas is trying to eliminate Mahmoud Abbas, the noble man of peace! It is clear that with such a gang there is no need, nor would it make any sense, to conduct negotiations about peace and borders.

And indeed, the US and their European satellites are boycotting the Palestinian government and starving the Palestinian population. They have set three conditions for lifting the blockade: (a) that the Palestinian government and Hamas must recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist, (b) they must stop "terrorism," and (c) they must undertake to fulfill the agreements signed by the PLO.

On the face of it, that makes sense. In reality, none at all. Because all these conditions are completely one-sided:

1. the Palestinians must recognize the right of Israel to exist (without defining its borders, of course), but the Israeli government is not required to recognize the right of a Palestinian state to exist at all.

2. The Palestinians must put an end to "terrorism," but the Israeli government is not required to stop its military operations in the Palestinian territories and stop the building of settlements. The "roadmap" does indeed say so, but that has been completely ignored by everybody, including the Americans.

3. The Palestinians must undertake to fulfill the agreements, but no such undertaking is required from the Israeli government, which has broken almost all provision of the Oslo agreement. Among others: the opening of the "safe passages" between Gaza and the West Bank, the carrying out of the third "redeployment" (withdrawal from Palestinian territories), the treatment of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as one single territory, etc. etc.

Since Hamas came to power, its leaders have understood the need to become more flexible. They are very sensitive to the mood of their people. The Palestinian population is longing for an end to the occupation and for a life of peace. Therefore, step by step, Hamas has come nearer to recognition of Israel. Their religious doctrine does not allow them to declare this publicly (Jewish fundamentalists too cling to the word of God "To your seed I have given this land") but it has been doing so indirectly. Little steps, but a big revolution.

Hamas has announced its support for the establishment of a Palestinian state bounded by the June 1967 borders—meaning: next to Israel and not in place of Israel. (This week, ex-minister Kadura Fares repeated that Hamas leader Khaled Mashal has confirmed this.) Hamas has given Mahmoud Abbas a power of attorney to conduct the negotiations with Israel and has undertaken in advance to accept any agreement ratified in a referendum. Abbas, of course, clearly advocates the setting up of a Palestinian state next to Israel, across the Green Line. There is no doubt whatsoever that if such an agreement is achieved, the huge majority of the Palestinian population will vote for it.

In Jerusalem, worry has set in. If this goes on, the world might even get the impression that Hamas has changed, and then—God forbid—lift the economic blockade on the Palestinian people.

Now the King of Saudi Arabia comes and disturbs Olmert's plans even more.

In an impressive event, facing the holiest site of Islam, the king put an end to the bloody strife between the Palestinian security organs and prepared the ground for a Palestinian government of national unity. Hamas undertook to respect the agreements signed by the PLO, including the Oslo agreement, which is based on the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people.

The king has extracted the Palestinian issue from the embrace of Iran, to which Hamas had turned because it had no alternative, and has returned Hamas to the lap of the Sunni family. Since Saudi Arabia is the main ally of the US in the Arab world, the king has put the Palestinian issue firmly on the table of the Oval Office.

In Jerusalem, near panic broke out. This is the scariest of nightmares: the fear that the unconditional support of the US and Europe for Israeli policy will be reconsidered.

It is not enough that Hamas recognize Israel in practice. Israel insists that its "right to exist" must also be recognized. Political recognition does not suffice, ideological recognition is required.

The panic had immediate results: "political circles" in Jerusalem announced that they rejected the Mecca agreement out of hand. Then second thoughts set in. Shimon Peres, long established master of the "yes-but-no" method, convinced Olmert that the brazen "no" must be replaced with a more subtle "no." For this purpose, the red herring was again taken out of the freezer.

It is not enough that Hamas recognize Israel in practice. Israel insists that its "right to exist" must also be recognized. Political recognition does not suffice, ideological recognition is required. By this logic, one could also demand that Khaled Mashal join the Zionist organization.

If one thinks that peace is more important for Israel than expansion and settlements, one must welcome the change in the position of Hamas—as expressed in the Mecca agreement—and encourage it to continue along this road. The king of Saudi Arabia, who has already convinced the leaders of all Arab countries to recognize Israel in exchange for the establishment of the state of Palestine across the Green Line, should be warmly congratulated.

But if one opposes peace because it would fix the final borders of Israel and allow for no more expansion, one will do everything to convince the Americans and Europeans to continue with the boycott on the Palestinian government and the blockade of the Palestinian people.

Condoleezza Rice will soon be convening a meeting of Olmert and Abbas in Jerusalem.

The Americans now have a problem. On one side, they need the Saudi king. Not only does he sit on huge oil reservoirs, but he is also the centerpiece of the "moderate Sunni bloc." If the king tells Bush that the solution of the Palestinian problem is needed in order to dam the spread of Iranian influence across the Middle East, his words will carry a lot of weight. If Bush is planning a military attack on Iran, as it seems he is, it is important for him to have the united support of the Sunnis.

On the other side, the pro-Israel lobby—both Jewish and Christian—is very important for Bush. It is vital for him to be able to count on the "Christian base" of the Republican Party, which is composed of fundamentalists who support the extreme Right in Israel, come what may.

So what is to be done? Nothing. For this nothing, Condi found an apt diplomatic slogan, taken from up-to-date American slang: "New Political Horizons."

Clearly, she did not ponder on the meaning of these words. Because the horizon is the symbol of a goal that will never be reached: the more you approach it, the more it recedes.

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Uri Avnery is an Israeli writer and peace activist with Gush Shalom. He is one of the writers featured in The Other Israel: Voices of Dissent and Refusal. He is also a contributor to CounterPunch's book The Politics of Anti-Semitism. He may be reached at: avnery@actcom.net.il.

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This story was published on February 19, 2007.

We Palestinians Will Honor Our Word

Opinion

Afif Safieh | Fri. Feb 16, 2007

I know of no way to measure suffering, no mechanism to quantify pain. All I know is that we Palestinians are not children of a lesser God.

Had I been a Jew or a Gypsy, I would consider the Holocaust to be the most atrocious event in history. Had I been a Native American, it would be the arrival of the European settlers and the subsequent near-total extermination of the indigenous population. Had I been an African American, it would be slavery in previous centuries and apartheid in the last. Had I been an Armenian, it would be the Turkish massacre.

I happen to be a Palestinian, and for Palestinians the most atrocious event in history is what we call the Nakba, the catastrophe. Humanity should consider all the above as morally unacceptable, all as politically inadmissible. Lest I be misunderstood, I am not comparing the Nakba to the Holocaust. Each catastrophe stands on its own, and I do not like to indulge in comparative martyrology or a hierarchy of tragedies. I only mention our respective traumas in order to illustrate that we each bring to the table our own particular history.

The fact that the accords reached last week in Mecca between Hamas and Fatah were met with a variety of reactions, ranging from warm to cautious to skeptical, makes it imperative to revisit and learn the lessons of the diplomatic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Time and again the three “no’s” of the Khartoum summit in 1967 — no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel — are invoked as proof conclusive of Arab intransigence toward Israel. Such a claim, however, conveniently forgets that Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and Jordan accepted United Nations Security Council resolution 242 just months after the Khartoum meeting.

Also forgotten is that Syria, after the October War in 1973 — the purpose of which, it should be remembered, was to reactivate a dormant diplomatic process and to capture the attention of American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — accepted U.N. resolution 338, which incorporated resolution 242. Ignored, too, is that the entire Arab world endorsed a peace plan put forth by the then-Saudi crown prince Fahd at a 1982 summit in Fez, Morocco, as well as unanimously backed the initiative put forth by then-Saudi crown prince Abdallah in Beirut in 2002.

For the Palestinian national movement, the October War in 1973 was a demarcation line in strategic thinking. It is then that we concluded that there was no military solution to the conflict. Until then we had advocated a unitary, democratic, bicultural, multiethnic and pluri-confessional state in Mandatory Palestine.

After 1973, a pragmatic coalition within the Palestine Liberation Organization emerged. Composed of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, Nayef Hawatmeh’s Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and As Sa’iqa, the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba’ath Party, the coalition demanded not absolute justice but rather possible justice within the framework of a two-state solution. The fact that As Sa’iqa belonged to that school of thought, it is worth noting, is proof that Damascus can be a constructive player in the region if properly engaged and its concerns addressed. Syria is not necessarily the eternal spoiler that needs to use the Lebanese theater or the Palestinian scene in order to remind everyone of its presence.

Led by this pragmatic coalition, the PLO was ready for a historical compromise as far back as 1974. It was not the rejectionist player, as many have labeled it, but rather the rejected party until the Oslo peace talks in 1993. Throughout its presence in Lebanon, the PLO aimed to remain a military factor so as to be accepted as a diplomatic actor.

I have told my many Israeli interlocutors that I believe that the Israeli posture in peace negotiations was to expect a diplomatic outcome that would reflect Israeli power and intransigence, American alignment toward Israeli preferences, declining Russian influence, European abdication, Arab impotence and what they hoped to be Palestinian resignation.

It is this attitude that has resulted in having a durable peace process instead of a lasting and permanent peace. Peace and security will stem not from territorial aggrandizement but from regional acceptance — and make no mistake about it, we Palestinians are the key to regional acceptance of Israel. For years now, the Arab world from Morocco to Muscat has been ready to recognize the existence of Israel if it withdraws back from its expanded 1967 borders. The perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict is due not to the Arab rejection of Israeli existence, but to the Israeli rejection of Arab acceptance.

The absence of a credible diplomatic avenue has allowed for the emergence and the strengthening of radical movements. The electoral defeat of Fatah in January 2006 was caused by a plurality of factors, not least of them the fact that Fatah became identified with negotiations and a peace process that was non-existent for the last six years and totally unconvincing during the years preceding. To the Palestinians, the last 15 years of “peacemaking” were years during which we witnessed the expansion of the occupation — with the number of settlers doubling — not a withdrawal from the occupation.

Now, however, there is a chance to move beyond this history. As a result of the agreement reached last week in Mecca, the Palestinian government will be more representative than at any period before. The new foreign minister, Ziad Abu Amr, both enjoys the confidence of Hamas and is a political friend of Mahmoud Abbas — who as PLO chairman is charged with negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people and as P.A. president has prerogative over the conduct of foreign affairs.

Both Fatah and Hamas are in favor of a cease-fire, for which they can now ensure disciplined Palestinian adherence — especially if it is reciprocated by the Israeli side and extended to the West Bank, where alas we have recently witnessed an escalation in assassinations and arrests. And in Mecca, Hamas and Fatah agreed that the Palestinian government will honor all agreements signed by the PLO, will abide by all the resolutions of previous Arab summits and will base its activity on international law.

The term “honor,” rest assured, has as much a ring of nobility to it in Arabic — if not more — as it does in any other language.

A territory that was occupied in 1967 in less than six days can also be evacuated in six days — so that Israelis can rest on the seventh, and we can all finally engage in the fascinating journey of nation-building and economic recovery.

Afif Safieh is head of the Palestine Liberation Organization Mission to the United States.

The Mecca Agreement: What Should We Expect?

The Makkah Agreement: What Should We Expect? By RAMZY BAROUD The Makkah agreement, signed between rival Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah on February 8, under the auspices of the Saudi leadership, was welcomed by thousands of cheering Palestinians throughout the occupied territories, and seen as the closing of a chapter of a bloody and tumultuous period of their history. Officially, although more subtly, there is an equal eagerness to bring a halt to an oppressive command of economic and diplomatic sanctions that have rendered most Palestinians unemployed and living well below the poverty line. In fact, almost all Palestinians want to remember, if they must, the bloody clashes that claimed the lives of over 90 people since December as a distant memory, a bitter deviation from a norm of unity and national cohesion, according to which they want their struggle to be remembered. Diplomatically, aides to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and advisors to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh are fanning out across the globe, each group heading to its traditional political milieus: the former group to Western Europe and the United States, and the latter to Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. Both Fatah and Hamas are keen to demonstrate that by endorsing the agreement, their fundamental position remains unchanged, an arduous task indeed. The official reactions to the agreement, emanating from the four corners of the globe are hardly encouraging. The so-called Middle East Quartet -- consisting of the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia -- although they welcomed the agreement, hoping that it might produce the desired ‘calm’, reiterated their conditions that must be unreservedly ratified by the Palestinian government if the sanctions are to be lifted; these conditions are the recognition of Israel, the renouncing of violence and the acceptance of past agreements signed between both parties, namely the Oslo Accords. Though the Quartet is seen to have withheld its final judgment on whether the formulation of the unity government constitutes an acceptance, either directly or by implication of its three conditions, Israel is embarking on its own diplomatic campaign to heighten pressure. Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, who was recently in Munich to attend a global security conference, has reportedly met EU’s defence and security coordinator Javier Solana, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and foreign ministers of Austria, Sweden and other countries. She has also spoken to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice twice over the phone, as reported in the Israeli daily Haaretz. Her phone diplomacy has also reached Germany, Britain and Norway. Livni’s behaviour is but a mere expression of the attitude that is currently being developed in Israel; the international community must continue to pressure Palestinians until the three conditions are satisfied in full from an Israeli point of view. The main predicament to the Israeli quest, however, is the same old dilemma: Palestinians can never, under any circumstances and no matter how great concessions are; meet Israeli expectations, for these expectations are crafted in so clever a way that makes is practically impossible for any Palestinian leader or government to comply. Neither late President Yasser Arafat, who wore an Israeli flag pin side by side with a Palestinian one on his Khaki jacket managed to live up to Israel’s seemingly ‘reasonable’ demands, nor did his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, who was ironically elevated in his political relevance to become the darling of Israel and Washington when Hamas swept the majority of the vote in the legislative elections of January 2006, which subsequently led to the devastating sanctions. The Israeli government labelled Abbas ‘weak’ and ‘indecisive’. He too, by the same standards, was not able to meet Israel’s conditions, why should we expect Hamas or any other to do so? The practical Israeli position -- as opposed to rhetorical - is rather clear and should not involve any exaggerated analysis: let Palestinians continue to be collectively punished, succumb to internal feuds and dwell in their limitless misery to allow Israel the needed time to further consolidate its territorial schemes in the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem: locking up more Palestinian communities in Bantustan-like localities, while Jewish settlements continue to be conveniently linked up to so-called “Israel proper” using the pretext of security and the mammoth and encroaching imprisonment wall as the means to such and end. The Makkah agreement’s import stems from whether it will present Israel with the opportunity to discredit Palestinians’ intentions, thus prolonging the international sanctions and internal chaos. Interestingly, these two points are also the core of the Palestinians efforts, who hope that the agreement, in which Hamas commits to ‘abide’ by past agreements signed by the PLO and Israel, is sufficient to end the effective state of chaos in the occupied territories and convince the international community that enough concessions have been made and that time has arrived for the sanctions to be lifted. This is likely to be the Israeli and Palestinian quest for the next few weeks, especially as the final judgment on the Makkah agreement is likely to be pronounced after two significant meetings: a tripartite summit that would bring together Rice, Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Monday, February 19, and two days later, a crucial meeting in Berlin of the Quartet’s ministers. Evidently, the US final position is expected to be slightly amended, if not a carbonic copy of that of Israel; no surprises there since President Bush’s administration foolishly amalgamated its Middle East policy with Israel’s self-serving national and regional agenda. But one must not be too hasty as to make such a determination without consulting the significance of the place in which the agreement was signed: Saudi Arabia. There is no doubt that the Saudi position has finally revitalised the role of Arab states in regional conflicts (the Makkah agreement was signed after incessant talks between Fatah and Hamas in Egypt and Jordan). London-based Saudi analyst Mai Yamani suggests that the Makkah agreement is an attempt to quell Iran’s growing influence in the region. "Iran has been financing Hamas, while the Saudis in the last few months even refused to meet (Hamas Prime Minister Ismail) Haniyeh. They realised that if there is more chaos in the Palestinian territories Iran will have more influence." If that assessment is accurate, partly or entirely, and considering the US’ own endeavours to undermine Iran’s strategic outreach in the region, it might indeed be rational for the US to live with the Makkah agreement and deal with the ‘moderate’ elements within the Palestinian government, even if temporarily. Yet again, the US hardly behaves in accordance with its own interests in the Middle East if such attitudes run counter to Israel’s own regional designs. The next a few weeks will reveal the potency of the Makkah agreement, as opposing interpretations of what it in fact means and how such meaning should be implemented will determine the next step for all parties involved. Its failure, however, which remains a dreadful possibility, shall have detrimental affects on the Palestinian people, any prospect for their coveted future unity and will further undermine their national agenda for years to come. -Ramzy Baroud’s latest book, The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle (Pluto Press), is available at Amazon.com and also from the University of Michigan Press. He is the editor of PalestineChronicle.com; his website is ramzybaroud.net