More inquiries into the intelligence activities of Feith's office coming?

More to Come?

The Defense Department Inspector General's report may only spell the beginning of inquiries into the intelligence activities of Douglas Feith's office.

Web Exclusive: 02.12.07

By Laura Rozen

This writer has reported extensively on a 2001 meeting in Rome between two then-members of the office of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar, Iranian intelligence operatives, and the Italian intelligence service. Reading the DoD IG (Defense Department Inspector General) report on its investigation into the activities of Feith's office, and watching Friday's Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the report, were, therefore, somewhat surreal experiences. What was surreal was their narrow focus on the question of the Pentagon policy shop's alternative intelligence analysis alleging Iraq-al-Qaeda links, when few dispute that the array of activities engaged in by Feith's shop was broader than that and hardly limited to alternative intelligence analysis.

Both the hearing and the unclassified two-page DoD IG report (with an accompanying PowerPoint presentation) were narrowly focused on the question of whether members of Feith's policy shop were in fact conducting intelligence activities regarding Iraq that should have been reported to Congress; they determined that they were. The IG also determined that the policy shop behaved inappropriately but not without authorization or illegally when in 2002 it presented to then-vice presidential chief of staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby and then-deputy national security advisor Stephen Hadley a slide presentation asserting links between al-Qaeda and Iraq. The policy office's presentation to the White House disagreed with the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community in several key respects, and was not cleared in advance with then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.

But even given the report's narrow focus on these questions, it was the subject of intense, heated, and politicized jockeying by Senator Armed Services Committee members grilling acting DoD Inspector General Thomas Gimble in the Russell Senate office building on February 9. Gimble, a 35-year veteran of the DoD IG's office, seemed desperate not to get drawn into the partisan fray. As the questioning intensified, he appeared unsure of how to respond to queries that seemed to demand he offer his opinion about issues that went far beyond the scope of his office’s purview.

For instance, Republican Jeff Sessions of Alabama, a former prosecutor, seemed to believe that Feith's office was perfectly within its rights to make an end run around the CIA to inform the White House that it had found evidence -- deemed unreliable by the intelligence community -- that 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta allegedly had a meeting with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in 2001. The CIA had early on determined that the source on the Prague meeting was unreliable, and the Czech intelligence service -- the United States' original source -- later fully recanted the claim. But listening to Sessions bear into Gimble, you might have thought that such facts were still in dispute.

The hearing also revealed seeming holes in the IG's powers to investigate even the narrow question of what Feith's shop channeled to the White House beyond the CIA's judgment on the Iraq-al-Qaeda matter. For instance, Gimble revealed under questioning, current national security advisor Stephen Hadley declined his office’s request to be interviewed. The IG interviewed more than 70 people as part of its review, but only Defense Department employees are apparently required to answer interview requests.

But what was most frustrating about the hearing was that the IG and the senators seemed to ignore instances -- such as the December 2001 Rome meeting involving Feith staff members, Ghorbanifar, and a foreign intelligence service -- that look far more like an intelligence collection operation -- even a covert action -- than the alternative intelligence analysis the IG report focused on. The Rome meeting was never mentioned in three hours of hearings at all, but it would certainly seem to be at the crux of a possible instance of an intelligence operation not reported to Congress -- although the meeting was authorized by the White House. While that meeting concerned Iran policy rather than Iraq, the IG has the ability to look at all intelligence issues pursued by Feith's office; the meeting's absence as a subject of investigation was mystifying.

At the hearing, Armed Services Committee Chairman Levin and Vice Chairman John Warner both made statements indicating that their committee would pursue the matter of Feith's shop further, calling witnesses that the DoD IG could not get to testify. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence may also pursue the matter. But one possibility to keep in mind is that the DoD IG’s office may have other ongoing investigations related to Pentagon activities that may not have been reported to Congress. An office spokesman, Gary Comerford, wouldn't confirm or deny any other specific reviews. But it's worth noting that members of Congress have requested that the Defense Department Inspector General investigate other, related questions -- such as connections between the Iraqi National Congress and U.S. persons, and what work the Rendon Group did for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Other possible IG reviews notwithstanding, one is still left with the sense that the Defense Department internal review did not deliver what Congress needs to serve the public -- especially entering a fourth year of public agonizing over the war in Iraq. Across town, at the Libby trial, so much has been revealed that belies the central narrative of the Defense Department review -- that a Pentagon office that evaded congressional oversight and made end runs around the CIA to channel its alternative intelligence analysis to the White House is a phenomenon rising merely to the level of inappropriate, and that U.S. bureaucratic processes are resilient enough to filter out corrupted intelligence from the policymakers consuming it. The task of challenging that narrative with the truth has ever greater urgency as we now see signs of similar patterns leading towards an escalation with Iran.

Laura Rozen is a Prospect senior correspondent.

CIA Analysts: Over 50% Of Bush's Iraq War Justifications Untrue

CIA doubts didn't deter Feith's team

Intelligence agencies disagreed with many of its prewar findings.

By Greg Miller and Julian E. Barnes
Times Staff Writers

February 10, 2007

WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration began assembling its case for war, analysts across the U.S. intelligence community were disturbed by the report of a secretive Pentagon team that concluded Iraq had significant ties to Al Qaeda.

Analysts from the CIA and other agencies "disagreed with more than 50%" of 26 findings the Pentagon team laid out in a controversial paper, according to testimony Friday from Thomas F. Gimble, acting inspector general of the Pentagon.

The dueling groups sat down at CIA headquarters in late August 2002 to try to work out their differences. But while the CIA agreed to minor modifications in some of its own reports, Gimble said, the Pentagon unit was utterly unbowed.

"They didn't make the changes that were talked about in that August 20th meeting," Gimble said, and instead went on to present their deeply flawed findings to senior officials at the White House.

The work of that special Pentagon unit — which was run by former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith — is one of the lingering symbols of the intelligence failures leading up to the war in Iraq.

The Bush administration's primary justification for invading Iraq was always its assertion that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. But Iraq's supposed ties to Al Qaeda — and therefore its connection to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks — were an important secondary argument, and one that resonated with many Americans in the lead-up to the war with Iraq.

The CIA and many other intelligence agencies were wrong in their assessments of Iraq's weapons programs. But the agency was always deeply skeptical about the ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

Most of the evidence that Feith's Office of Special Plans cited in making its case for significant collaboration between Baghdad and Al Qaeda has crumbled under postwar scrutiny. The Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded that Saddam Hussein was so wary of the terrorist network that he barred anyone in his government from dealing with Al Qaeda.

Although the Pentagon Inspector General's report released Friday did not address the accuracy of such assessments, it documented the unusual efforts by Defense Department policymakers to bypass regular intelligence channels and influence officials at the highest level of government.

Feith's work was of critical importance to Vice President Dick Cheney, who once referred to the Pentagon team's conclusions as the "best source" for understanding the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

The activities of Feith's group weren't illegal, Gimble concluded. But they were, "in our opinion, inappropriate, given that the intelligence assessments were [presented as] intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the intelligence community."

The Pentagon team touted a series of claims that have not survived postwar review. Among them was the allegation that Mohammed Atta, the presumed ringleader of the Sept. 11 hijackers, had met with an Iraqi agent in Prague before the attacks.

A critical question raised by the inspector general's report is whether Feith and his office were just critiquing CIA analysis, or were creating their own intelligence assessment, a role that is supposed to be left to the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) noted Friday that Cheney has referred to Feith's work as an "assessment," suggesting it was a formal intelligence document. But Feith maintained in interviews he was not creating an intelligence "product," but was just checking the work of the CIA.

Laurence H. Silberman, a semiretired U.S. appeals court judge and co-chairman of a presidential commission on Iraq's weapons, said it is appropriate to question intelligence.

"Policymakers, whether they are in Defense, State, the White House or Congress, are absolutely entitled to question the intelligence community, look over the material and come up with their own views," he said.

Feith's work had the blessing of his boss, former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. The operation was set up at the behest of then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz with approval from Rumsfeld, Gimble noted. By most accounts, those three officials had distrust, if not disdain, for the work of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

But Robert M. Gates, the new secretary of Defense and former CIA director, said that groups outside the CIA and other chartered intelligence agencies should not be involved in freelance analysis.

"Based on my whole career, I believe all intelligence activities need to be carried on by the established institutions, where there is appropriate oversight," he told reporters traveling with him in Europe for meetings on security.

Gimble provided new details on the chain of events leading from the creation of the Feith team, through a series of briefings it made for senior officials and culminating in a presentation before deputies in the National Security Council at the White House.

The initial instruction to search for links between Iraq and Al Qaeda came from Wolfowitz in January 2002, Gimble said.

By that July, Feith had assembled a group of analysts detailed from other agencies to draft a document outlining evidence that the officials thought other agencies had ignored.

The team presented its findings to Rumsfeld on Aug. 8. Rumsfeld found it so compelling that he urged Feith to arrange a briefing for then-CIA Director George J. Tenet at the CIA. In the meantime, the team's paper began to circulate among analysts at other agencies who took issue with more than half of its contents.

"There were like 26 points," in the Feith team's paper, Gimble said. "And essentially [experts at other agencies] disagreed with more than 50% of it, and either agreed or partially agreed with the remainder."

When the team briefed Tenet and other senior CIA officials on Aug. 15, the audience was polite but unimpressed. Tenet described the meeting as "useful," Gimble said, but "in our interviews with him he later said that he only said that it was 'useful' because he didn't agree with it and he was just trying to, you know, nicely end the meeting."

That encounter led to the "roundtable" meeting at the agency five days later where CIA experts urged the Pentagon unit to at least include footnotes acknowledging the long list of disagreements.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon team pressed on.

P.J. Crowley, a retired Air Force colonel and a senior fellow at the Center of American Progress, said that the intelligence peddled by Feith tainted the public dialogue.

"They weren't creating intelligence, but they were assembling the pieces to create a rationale for war," Crowley said. "Their production was discredited, but they had the desired effect. The little pieces ended up infecting the process."

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greg.miller@latimes.com

julian.barnes@latimes.com

Times staff writer Peter Spiegel in Seville, Spain, contributed to this report.