Does Putin Not Have a Point?

by Patrick J. Buchanan

Posted 02/13/2007 ET

"A soft answer turneth away wrath," teaches Proverbs 1:15.

Our new secretary of defense, Roberts Gates, seems familiar with the verse. For his handling of Saturday's wintry blast from Vladimir Putin at the Munich security conference was masterful.

"As an old Cold Warrior, one of yesterday's speeches almost filled me with nostalgia for a less complex time," said Gates, adding, "Almost." A former director of the CIA, Gates went on to identify with Putin: "I have, like your second speaker yesterday ... a career in the spy business. And I guess old spies have a habit of blunt speaking.

"However, I have been to re-education camp, spending the last four-and-a-half years as a university president and dealing with faculty. And as more than a few university presidents have learned in recent years, when it comes to faculty it is either 'be nice' or 'be gone.'"

Gates added he would be going to Moscow to talk with the old KGB hand, who will be retiring as Russia's president around the time President Bush goes home to Crawford. Excellent.

For one of the historic blunders of this administration has been to antagonize and alienate Russia, the winning of whose friendship was a signal achievement of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. And one of the foreign policy imperatives of this nation is for statesmanship to repair the damage.

What did we do to antagonize Russia?

When the Cold War ended, we seized upon our "unipolar moment" as the lone superpower to seek geopolitical advantage at Russia's expense.

Though the Red Army had picked up and gone home from Eastern Europe voluntarily, and Moscow felt it had an understanding we would not move NATO eastward, we exploited our moment. Not only did we bring Poland into NATO, we brought in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and virtually the whole Warsaw Pact, planting NATO right on Mother Russia's front porch. Now, there is a scheme afoot to bring in Ukraine and Georgia in the Caucasus, the birthplace of Stalin.

Second, America backed a pipeline to deliver Caspian Sea oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, to bypass Russia.

Third, though Putin gave us a green light to use bases in the old Soviet republics for the liberation of Afghanistan, we now seem hell-bent on making those bases in Central Asia permanent.

Fourth, though Bush sold missile defense as directed at rogue states like North Korea, we now learn we are going to put anti-missile systems into Eastern Europe. And against whom are they directed?

Fifth, through the National Endowment for Democracy, its GOP and Democratic auxiliaries, and tax-exempt think tanks, foundations and "human rights" institutes such as Freedom House, headed by ex-CIA director James Woolsey, we have been fomenting regime change in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet republics and Russia herself.

U.S.-backed revolutions have succeeded in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia, but failed in Belarus. Moscow has now legislated restrictions on the foreign agencies that it sees, not without justification, as subversive of pro-Moscow regimes.

Sixth, America conducted 78 days of bombing of Serbia for the crime of fighting to hold on to her rebellious province, Kosovo, and for refusing to grant NATO marching rights through her territory to take over that province. Mother Russia has always had a maternal interest in the Orthodox states of the Balkans.

These are Putin's grievances. Does he not have a small point?

Joe Lieberman denounced Putin's "Cold War rhetoric." But have we not been taking what cannot unfairly be labeled Cold War actions?

How would we react if China today brought Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela into a military alliance, convinced Mexico to sell oil to Beijing and bypass the United States, and began meddling in the affairs of Central America and Caribbean countries to effect the electoral defeat of regimes friendly to the United States? How would we react to a Russian move to put anti-missile missiles on Greenland?

Gates says we have been through one Cold War and do not want another. But it is not Moscow moving a military alliance right up to our borders or building bases and planting anti-missile systems in our front and back yards.

Why are we doing this? This country is not going to go to war with Russia over Estonia. With our Army "breaking" from two insurgencies, how would we fight? By bombing Moscow and St. Petersburg?

Just as we deluded ourselves into believing this war would be a "cakewalk," that democracy would break out across the Middle East, that we would be beloved in Baghdad, so America today has undertaken commitments, dating to the Cold War and since, we do not remotely have the resources or will to fulfill. We are living in a world of self-delusion.

Somewhere in this presidential campaign, someone has to bring us back to earth. The halcyon days of American Empire are over.

Patrick J. Buchanan (more by this author)

Kosovo says Yes to UN plan but Serbia says No

February 2, 2007

By Ellie Tzortzi and Matt Robinson

BELGRADE/PRISTINA (Reuters) - United Nations envoy Martti Ahtisaari on Friday unveiled a plan to set the breakaway province of Kosovo on a path to independence, an outcome immediately welcomed by Kosovo Albanians and rejected by Serbia.

Ahtisaari's proposal did not mention the word "independence" or address the loss of Serbia's sovereignty over the territory. But both sides said this was clearly what it implied.

"Kosovo will be sovereign like all other countries," said Kosovo president Fatmir Sejdiu after meeting Ahtisaari in Kosovo's capital Pristina, where there were celebrations.

Prime Minister Agim Ceku, a former guerrilla in the 1998-99 Kosovo Liberation Army which fought the forces of the late Serb strongman Slobodan Milosevic, said the document "is very clear for Kosovo's future".

After a meeting in Serbia, President Boris Tadic agreed that the plan "opens up the possibility of independence". But Tadic said he told the envoy: "Serbia and I as its president will never accept the independence of Kosovo."

Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has condemned Ahtisaari for "anti-Serb bias", and took the lead in rejecting his plan in advance, refusing even to meet the envoy on Friday.

The plan gives Kosovo access to international bodies usually reserved for sovereign states and to use its own flag, anthem and other symbols.

"The settlement provides for an international representative to supervise the implementation," Ahtisaari told a news conference. The NATO-led peace force "will continue to provide a safe and secure environment ... as long as necessary".

It includes measures to "promote sustainable economic development including Kosovo's ability to apply for membership in international financial institutions", he added.

LAST CHANCE

Ahtisaari declined several opportunities to address the issue of Kosovo's ultimate status, saying this would be settled by the United Nations Security Council once he formally presented his plan, following a last round of consultations.

He said the diametrically opposed positions of the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians were "extremely fixed", but he was allowing them "one more chance" to find compromise.

Invitations would be sent for a meeting in Vienna on Feb. 13 and it would be up to Serbs and leaders of Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian majority to decide whether to turn up.

The former Finnish president mediated months of largely fruitless talks in 2006. "Maybe they have had enough," he said. "I can't force anyone to participate."

There was no point in waiting for a new government to be formed following Serbia's inconclusive election last month, he said. "Whether it's now or a little bit later, the same people would be on either side of the table."

"The final process starts when the plan enters the Security Council," Ahtisaari said, indicating that could be next month.

The European Union urged both sides to respond "positively and constructively" to Ahtisaari's proposals. The U.S. State Department said the proposal "is fair and balanced. It is a blueprint for a stable, prosperous and multi-ethnic Kosovo".

The poor landlocked province of two million is cherished by Serbs as the medieval homeland of their nation.

Kosovo has been run by the U.N. since 1999 when NATO bombing forced Milosevic to withdraw troops accused of killing 10,000 Albanians during a counter-insurgency war. About 100,000 ethnic Serbs remain. Some predict violence and secession, and both NATO and the U.N. mission have made contingency plans for a crisis.

"There is nothing more we can do," said Kosovo Serb accountant Milica Knezevic, "there's no life for us here."

President Tadic has told Serbs Kosovo might already be lost.

Kostunica says he will never accept this and is urging all parties in the next government to solemnly pledge that Serbia will cut ties with any country recognising the province as an independent state, including major Western powers.

(Additional reporting by Beti Bilandzic, Monika Lajhner, Ivana Sekularac in Belgrade and Matt Robinson in Pristina)

Copyright © 2006 Reuters

Delay in recognising Kosovo will invite more bloodshed

Post-bombing western guilt is making things worse in the Balkans. Serbia's nationalists have to see the game is lost

Jonathan Steele
Friday January 26, 2007
The Guardian

Remember Kosovo, the small province of Serbia that sparked the first shooting war in Nato's 50-year history? Astonishingly, it is almost eight years since US and British bombers went into action over Belgrade, and the problem has still not been solved. Kosovo's large Albanian majority has not got the independence it was demanding after decades of oppression that culminated in a merciless campaign of ethnic cleansing by the now dead Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic. For their part, Serbs are still obsessed with the issue. Their election last Sunday revolved around it, giving the ultra-nationalist Radical party as impressive a victory as it had in 2003.

Meanwhile, international efforts to broker a solution continue to stumble. A UN envoy who was appointed over a year ago to consult all sides and come up with a compromise package will present his proposals today. But there is a looming danger that his work will be in vain, unless Europe and the US radically alter their current line. It seems incredible that countries which went to war to enforce their views should now be lapsing into delay and dither. But that appears to be the case. It is even more incredible given that the envoy's proposals for Kosovo's future squeak as softly as a church mouse. I am told they do not even use the word "independence".

In the eight years since the Nato war, a gamut of thinktanks and experts, not to mention western diplomats, argued that the best solution for Kosovo would be "conditional independence". The suggestion was that even a free Kosovo would need a form of temporary international supervision, backed by foreign troops and police, in order to protect the Serbian minority but also to deter any attempt by Belgrade to reconquer the province by force.

The UN envoy is Martti Ahtisaari, a distinguished former president of Finland and one of Europe's most experienced negotiators. He was asked to proceed on the understanding that there could be no partition of the province, no change of borders, and no return to Serbian rule. There was also an implicit principle that an agreed solution was better than an imposed one.

Reluctant Kosovo leaders were pressed into negotiating with their former masters in Belgrade. They made a series of concessions on local government that allow the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo to become municipalities, run their own affairs, and keep financial links with Serbia. Ahtisaari patiently listened to both sides, as well as to Russia, Serbia's principal backer, and to Quint, the shorthand name for the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

The result is a package to go to the UN security council for approval. It will fudge the independence word by not attempting to define Kosovo's future status and not allowing the territory a UN seat. It will be boringly technical, focusing mainly on property issues, international lending arrangements, and mechanisms by which the EU and a so-called International Civilian Office can take over a reduced version of the UN's supervisory role in Kosovo.

All fine and constructive. The snag is what happens to the package next. One might have thought that after you appoint a statesman to study an issue, conduct complex diplomacy, and craft a compromise, you close the process by implementing it. Not a bit of it. The Quint decided last week that a new round of consultations is needed. John Sawers, the British Foreign Office's political director, was in Pristina this week to break the news to the Kosovans.

This could be fatal, since the Serbs are masters of delay. Under pressure from Quint, Ahtisaari gave Belgrade an unnecessary concession last autumn by delaying the announcement of his package until after Serbia's elections. Serbian politicians are now saying there should be more delay until a coalition government is formed, a process of haggling that could last months. Only then can meaningful talks take place. After that there may be presidential elections, etc, etc.

Why the western spinelessness? Three factors are in play. One appears to be post-bombing guilt. Having made war in 1999, Nato and its EU members are now wooing Serbia on all fronts. In November, Nato took it into the Partnership for Peace programme after dropping its requirement that Serbia arrest the indicted war criminal and butcher of Bosnia, General Ratko Mladic, and send him to The Hague.

The second factor is a western illusion that Serbia is divided into "nationalists" and "pro-Europeans". So the west takes heed of the latter's siren voices that constantly tell gullible EU ambassadors "Shh, we need your help. Protect us from the radicals. Don't put pressure on us for concessions." Last Sunday's election result exploded that fraud. The few parties which accept that Kosovo is lost won only 7%. On the "pro-European" side all that happened was a redistribution of votes among four competing parties. President Boris Tadic's Democratic party did best out of this, largely because he showed he was still a good nationalist last year by supporting a backward-looking new constitution that says Kosovo can never be detached from Serbia.

The final factor is anxiety about a Russian veto on the security council. Diplomats say the new consultations are to show Moscow the west has "gone the extra mile". But Russia's role ought not to be exaggerated. Under Ahtisaari's modest proposals, the UN would not recognise Kosovo's independence. It would be left to each country to do so if it wished - and however the Russians vote.

On Kosovo, the EU is more important than the UN. If the EU holds firm when its foreign ministers meet next month it can salvage the situation by coming out strongly behind Ahtisaari, putting a short time limit on further consultations, and declaring it will recognise Kosovo, whatever Russia does. Much will depend on Germany. As current president of the EU, Germany has a chance to show leadership on a major European issue. Many Europeans charge Germany with helping to precipitate the Balkan wars of the 1990s by hasty recognition of Croatia. It would be ironic if Germany over-compensates now by delaying the recognition of Kosovo, and thereby precipitating Balkan violence again.

Those are indeed the stakes, and they are far from trivial. Until Serbia's nationalists see the game is lost and over, they will never be marginalised. Only then will Serbs become the nice modern Europeans the EU wants them to be.

j.steele@guardian.co.uk

Jonathan Steele is a Guardian columnist, roving foreign correspondent and author. He was the Guardian's bureau chief in Washington (1975 to 1979) and Moscow (1988 to 1994). In the 80s he reported from southern Africa, central America, Afghanistan, and Eastern Europe. In the 90s he covered Kosovo and the Balkans. Since 9/11 he has reported from Afghanistan and Iraq as well as on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. He has written several books on international affairs, including books on South Africa, Germany, eastern Europe, and Russia.

Serbia's Next PM Faces Imperial Carve-Up

Related UN plan for Kosovo promises independence, with strings --- January 27, 2007

And the Winner Is…

by Nebojsa Malic

The general elections in Serbia, held on January 21, were described as "low-key" by the BBC. Somewhat greater voter turnout than in the past – 60% of the electorate showed up at the polls – didn't translate into clear results, however. Of the 250 seats in the Skupstina, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) got the biggest share – 81 – but not enough to form a majority. Sixty-four seats went to the Democratic Part (DS) of President Boris Tadic, and 47 to the Popular Bloc of outgoing Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. His former coalition partners, G17 Plus, won 19 seats. Sixteen went to the Socialists (SPS), once led by Slobodan Milosevic, and eight were filled with candidates from ethnic minority parties. Fifteen seats went to a coalition led by Cedomir Jovanovic's Liberal Democrats (LDP). Cheering from the Sidelines From the very beginning, the campaign was influenced from the outside – first by the decision of the UN to postpone its recommendations on the future status of the occupied Serbian province of Kosovo, and then by the constant pressure from the EU and US to elect "pro-Western" candidates. UK and US ambassadors wrote editorials in Serbian papers, hectoring voters. So did the British PM Tony Blair. US diplomat Daniel Fried openly cheered for the Democratic Party. After the results were announced, these same people issued congratulations to the "democratic victors" – obviously expecting their favorites to somehow overcome their internal disputes and form a government that would obediently accept diktats from the Empire, just as DOS once did. Winners and Losers Even though they got the largest share of the votes, the Radicals didn't really win the election. They cannot form a government of their own, and the odds of other parties forming a coalition with them are slim. This is mostly because the Radicals are reviled by the Empire, and the other parties are competing mainly in who can grovel more and better before Washington and Brussels. Similarly, the Democrats may claim victory, but they won far fewer votes than they hoped for, and now have the unenviable choice of making deals with parties they've sniped at in the past. Some analysts float the mathematical possibility of a DS-G17-LDP minority government, but the leadership conflicts in this arrangement make it an unlikely development in reality. Kostunica and his Popular Bloc didn't do too well, but are still in a strong position to influence policy, and may well become a junior partner in the new government. The biggest winners by far are Cedomir Jovanovic and the LDP. Formerly a fringe splinter of the Democrats, the LDP gathered up all the loud, malicious voices of Jacobinism and Empire-worship and won parliamentary representation. Already wielding public influence widely disproportionate to their marginal political strength, the Jacobins now have a parliamentary outlet. Conversely, the elections were an utter defeat for Vuk Draskovic, whose coalition with Kostunica in the last government got him the position of Foreign Minister. His party, once considered the main opposition to Milosevic, didn't even qualify to enter the parliament. The post-Milosevic Serbia has been cursed by an astoundingly poor choice of top diplomats in times when diplomacy was crucial – first the treacherous Goran Svilanovic, then the uncouth, self-centered Draskovic – so whoever follows on the job would almost have to be an improvement by default. This being Serbia, that is by no means a foregone conclusion. Kosovo Looming Unfortunately, what Serbia needs most at this juncture is a strong government and a strong diplomacy. After delaying the proposal for "resolving" the status of occupied Kosovo for almost three months, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari has met with Contact Group representatives in Vienna this Friday, and is scheduled to announce his plan to Belgrade and the Albanians next week. Ahtisaari – and more importantly, those in the US and Europe pushing for a separation of Kosovo from Serbia – are seizing on the moment when the government in Belgrade is in transition. Another clue is in the perception of the Democrats: "The major parties all say they will not accept the loss of Kosovo, but the Democratic Party of President Boris Tadic – the party favored by the West – has come closest to telling Serbs that it might be inevitable." (Reuters) Britain's Daily Telegraph phrased it similarly, calling the Democrats "the only major party to accept that Kosovan sovereignty is probably a fait accompli." Western cheerleading for Tadic and his party now begins to make sense. Ahtisaari's Plan In a feature published Thursday, Reuters writer Douglas Hamilton rightly described what's coming as the "carve-up" of Serbia. Hamilton cites Ahtisaari's claim that his proposal "provides the foundations for a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo in which the rights and interests of all members of its communities are firmly guaranteed and protected." That is, of course, complete and utter nonsense. If human rights of non-Albanians could not have been protected in the past seven-plus years, with a UN government and a presence of up to 60,000 NATO troops, how can anyone honestly expect that a KLA-dominated Albanian regime running an independent Kosovo would guarantee them? The systematic murder and expulsion of Serbs, and destruction of Serb property and heritage, that have taken place during the occupation are crystal clear indicators that no Serbs would survive in an independent "Kosova." Otherwise, why would NATO be "braced for a possible Serb exodus"? (Reuters) Matt Robinson of Reuters cites "diplomatic and UN sources" as to the contents of Ahtisaari's plan, considering Kosovo's separation a fait accompli. According to these enthusiastic leaks, the proposal "gives Kosovo the right to enter into international agreements and apply for membership of international organizations and institutions… talks of the right to ‘dual-citizenship' and urges Pristina to establish good relations with Serbia and other neighboring states." Of course, all this would be done under the supervision of 15,000 NATO troops and an EU governor, with similar powers to those of the Bosnian Viceroys since Dayton. As "compensation," Serbs would get some local autonomy, empty promises about protection of heritage, and the possibility of getting money from Belgrade – so long as Pristina takes a cut first. "In effect, Kosovo would be given the attributes of independence but remain under the wing of the international community … similar to the status given to Bosnia in 1995," comments the Financial Times. Deliberate Attrition Faced with unexpected opposition from Belgrade and Moscow over the past year or so, the US and EU imperialists appear to have decided the solution to their Kosovo conundrum should be more of the same. They know they have no legal grounds for declaring the occupied province independent. A recent LA Times article analyzing the "inevitable" loss of Kosovo, contained this interesting passage: "US diplomats queried on the point said that lawyers had not looked at the precedents but that Kosovo's case was different because it had been a UN protectorate, and that the Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing' there in 1999 in effect ended Serbia's right to control the province." This sort of "logic" is ludicrous. Kosovo was made a UN protectorate in 1999 following an illegal NATO aggression, launched not to stop alleged "ethnic cleansing," but to impose a peace agreement (Rambouillet). Faced with a shortage of arguments, the Empire is trying the argument of force; to effect, continuing the occupation until "status quo" becomes so entrenched that independence remains the only option. Ahtisaari's proposal doesn't end the occupation, but rather redefines it – to benefit the independence cause. The rationalization offered by editors at the Los Angeles Times, who endorsed the Ahtisaari proposal, confirms this reasoning: "…the UN compromise is the only practical solution for now… The two sides aren't ready to be peaceful neighbors, but taking small steps in that direction, while preserving the peace, would help them get used to the idea" 'Nice, Soft Landing' Imperial policymakers may think that by establishing a "democratic" government in Belgrade they've neutralized Serb opposition, and that Moscow would accept some sort of payoff (neither of which may be true), but that still leaves the Albanians themselves to manage. Promised independence by the KLA, having seen NATO support it in 1999 with bombs and boots on the ground, and assured near-constantly by the partisan press and high-powered allies in the West that their seizure of Kosovo was a foregone conclusion, the Albanians are getting impatient and unhappy. Certainly many of their leaders understand what Ahtisaari's proposal will eventually accomplish, but how do they communicate this to the masses they've fired up to extraordinary lengths of single-minded hatred? EU's foreign policy commissar Javier Solana, himself a key player in the events of 1999, told the Albanians this week, "It is very important that everybody behaves properly if we want the last part of the journey to have a nice, soft landing." Facing a Choice In order to make Kosovo's separation "nice and soft," the Empire needs Serbia's acquiescence. The pressure is again on Serbia to approve of this land grab. Whoever ends up leading the new government in Belgrade will have to make a choice: defend Serbian sovereignty, constitution and interests, or submit to Imperial coercion. While Moscow's support is promising, Russia can't – and shouldn't – fight battles the Serbs themselves aren't interested in fighting. However watered down, Ahtisaari's proposal is still secession. There is no way Belgrade can, or should, agree to this. Nebojsa Malic left his home in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords and currently resides in the United States. During the Bosnian War he had exposure to diplomatic and media affairs in Sarajevo. As a historian who specializes in international relations and the Balkans, Malic has written numerous essays on the Kosovo War, Bosnia, and Serbian politics. His exclusive column for Antiwar.com debuted in November 2000. "Balkan Express" appears every Thursday. For more of his thoughts on the Balkans and other topics, check out his blog.

NATO Rebuffs Bush on Troops for Afghanistan

By Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Judy Dempsey
The New York Times

Leaders of the 26 NATO nations failed to agree Wednesday on President Bush's demand that member countries with troops in Afghanistan lift their restrictions on how the troops are used. Those rules keep some soldiers from operating in the most dangerous part of the country.

Instead of lifting the restrictions entirely, France, Germany and Italy agreed to allow their troops to be sent in emergencies to bolster the NATO forces in the south, where Taliban forces have fought with renewed vigor.

The NATO leaders also unexpectedly opened the door to membership to Serbia by offering it partnership status, along with Bosnia and Montenegro. Up until now, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have blocked Serbia because of its failure to arrest two men who led Serbian forces during the fighting in Bosnia - Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who have been indicted for war crimes by the international tribunal in The Hague.

The offer Wednesday of offered partnership status - a step toward full membership - came with the condition that Serbia promise to try to capture the wanted pair and other figures charged with war crimes.

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http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/29/news/web.1129NATO.php