It seems ironic now, but the neo-conservatives who pushed for the invasion of Iraq counted on the Shi'ite majority actually becoming the allies of the US - and Israel! - in containing Iran. By the time they realized their error, it was too late to put the genie of sectarian civil war back in the bottle.
---
Feb 8, 2007
Shi'ite power a law unto itself
By Gareth Porter
WASHINGTON - The supreme irony of US President George W Bush's campaign to blame Iran for the sectarian civil war in Iraq, as well as attacks on US forces, is that the Shi'ite militias who started to drive the Sunnis out of the Baghdad area in 2004 and thus precipitated the present sectarian crisis did so with the support of both Iran and the neo-conservative US war planners.
The US policy decisions that led to the sectarian war can be traced back to the conviction of a group of right-wing zealots with close ties to Israel's Likud Party that overthrowing the regime of the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein would not destabilize the region, because Iraqi Shi'ites would be allies of the United States and Israel against Iran.
The idea that Iraqi Shi'ites could be used to advance US power interests in the Middle East was part of a broader right-wing strategy for joint US-Israeli "rollback" of Israel's enemies. In 1996, a task force at the right-wing Israeli think-tank the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, under Richard Perle, advised then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu that such a strategy should begin by taking control of Iraq and putting a pro-Israeli regime in power there.
Three years later, the former director of that think-tank, David Wurmser, who had migrated to the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI), spelled out how the United States could use Iraqi Shi'ites to support that strategy in Tyranny's Ally. Wurmser sought to refute the realist argument that overthrowing Saddam would destroy the balance of power between Sunni-controlled Iraq and Shi'ite Iran on which regional stability depended.
Wurmser proposed replacing the existing "dual containment" policy toward Iran and Iraq with what he called "dual rollback". He did not deny that taking down Saddam's regime would "generate upheaval in Iraq", but he welcomed that prospect, which would "offer the oppressed, majority Shi'ites of that country an opportunity to enhance their power and prestige".
Whereas the "realists" had assumed that the Iraqi Shi'ites would be "Iran's fifth column", Wurmser argued that the Iraqi Shi'ite clerics would "present a challenge to Iran's influence and revolution". He cited their rejection of the central concept of the Iranian revolution of ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini - the "rule of the jurisprudent" - justifying clerical rule.
From that fact, Wurmser leaped to the conclusion that Iraqi Shi'ites would be an ally of the United States in promoting a "regional rollback of Shi'ite fundamentalism". Wurmser even suggested that Iraqi Shi'ites could help pry Lebanese Shi'ites, with whom they had enjoyed close ties historically, away from the influence of Hezbollah and Iran.
Wurmser was close to the key officials in the Pentagon and the White House who were planning the invasion of Iraq: deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz and under secretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith. After September 11, 2001, it was Wurmser who set up the now-infamous "Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group" in Feith's office to produce the evidence that could be used to justify invading Iraq. After the US occupation, he became Vice President Dick Cheney's Middle East adviser.
The neo-conservative plan for invading Iraq reflected Wurmser's assumption that the United States would not need to plan a long military occupation of Iraq, because toppling Saddam's regime would unleash the power of the Iraqi Shi'ites.
But the political realities in Iraq were nothing like Wurmser and his allies imagined them. They had not counted on the Sunnis mounting an effective resistance instead of rolling over. Nor had they anticipated that Shi'ite clerics of Iraq would demand national elections and throw their support behind the militant Shi'ite parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Da'wa, which had returned from exile in Iran in the wake of the US overthrow of Saddam.
SCIRI and Da'wa were not what the hardliners had in mind when they thought about Shi'ite power in Iraq. Their paramilitary formations had been created, trained and nurtured by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, and their views on international politics were not known to be distinguishable from those of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The neo-conservatives also knew that the Da'wa Party was a terrorist organization. Its operatives were behind the bombing of the US and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983 in an effort to drive the US out of that country. (One of the Shi'ites elected to the Iraqi Parliament in December 2005, Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, was said by the US Embassy spokesman on Tuesday to be under investigation for his participation in that bombing.)
When Ahmad Chalabi's American enemies accused the neo-conservative favorite of having spied for Iran, and the National Security Council wrote a policy paper called "Marginalizing Chalabi", the neo-cons outside the government were livid. Michael Ledeen wrote a column in the National Review Online on May 28 pointing out that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of SCIRI, and Ibrahim Jaafari of the Da'wa were still on the Iranian payroll, but were nevertheless "in our good graces".
Meanwhile, the AEI's Michael Rubin began warning in the spring of 2004 that Iran was consolidating its influence in Shi'ite southern Iraq by funneling large amounts of money into support for their Iraqi clients.
But Wolfowitz, Feith and Wurmser, faced with a rising tide of Sunni armed resistance, had already decided they had to accept the pro-Iranian groups as temporary allies against the Sunnis. When Wolfowitz testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 18, 2004, he suggested that the Bush administration had accepted the continued existence of these Shi'ite militias as long as they remained friendly to the United States.
As for disarming them, he said, "That is not part of the mission unless it is necessary to bring them under control." Once the US had been able to build an "alternative security institution", he said, "then the militias can go away".
The war planners in the Bush administration had also decided that the militant Shi'ites would get their election in January 2005, which meant that a Shi'ite government would be formed later that year. With those decisions, the descent of Iraq into sectarian civil war became unavoidable.
Throughout 2004 and the first half of 2005, the Shi'ite militias took advantage of the supportive policy of the United States to consolidate their power in Baghdad and began terrorizing Sunni communities. After the government formed under the Da'wa Party's Ibrahim Jaafari, the Shi'ite Badr Organization moved into the Ministry of Interior, which became a vehicle for state terror. Despite media coverage of Shi'ite death squads operating freely in the capital, the Bush administration refused to admit there was any problem with Shi'ite militias.
Only in October 2005, after what must have been a fierce internal struggle in Washington, did the US Embassy began to oppose the Shi'ite effort to force Sunnis out of the capital. By then it was far too late. The genie of sectarian civil war could not be put back in the bottle.
Gareth Porter is a historian and national-security policy analyst. His latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in June 2005.
Wednesday, February 7, 2007
How Sadr Plans to Ride Out the US Surge
Friday, Feb. 02, 2007
Moqtada Sadr and his Mehdi Army seem to have decided that, for now, the best defense against the American troop surge is no defense. Rather than risk another major confrontation like the battles of 2004 in which they lost thousands of men, the military and political leadership of Sadr's movement is going out of its way to be conciliatory.
Following an American raid last month that netted one of Sadr's lieutenants, some Sadrists threatened to hold up the movement's reconciliation with the national government. Instead, Sadrist ministers who had been boycotting parliament to protest against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki meeting with President Bush rejoined the government. And this week, the Sadrists even endorsed the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Baghdad and the new security plan. A local official in the Mehdi Army's Sadr City stronghold said that under the terms of a deal with U.S. forces, the Americans would be welcome in Sadr City.
But allowing the Americans to pass unchallenged through Sadr City is not the same thing as embracing the U.S. agenda for Iraq. It may simply make tactical sense to stand down the Mehdi Army temporarily, denying the U.S. military a target. Meanwhile the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi security forces, which include many Sadr sympathizers and actual members of his militia, continue their fight against Sunni insurgents.
U.S. officials have painted the surge as a temporary step, some hinting that it may last only a matter of months. That's not a long time in the outlook of an organization that must consider its position in Iraq in terms of decades. If political support for the U.S. presence in Iraq collapses, or if the military simply cannot sustain a meaningful increase in troop strength, the Mehdi Army will have won a victory without ever joining the battle.
Ironically, the Americans' greatest hope for success in defeating the Shi'ite militia may be the Sunni insurgency. Despite token attempts at national reconciliation, they are not part of the political process, do not negotiate meaningfully with the government, and are under no illusions about what a "troop surge" means for them. In recent weeks they've faced U.S. air strikes and Iraqi Army raids in downtown Baghdad. And the insurgents have continued to rain terror down on mostly Shi'ite civilian concentrations, in market places, universities and religious gatherings.
So, while Sadr may be able to cut deals with the Americans, Shi'ites in Baghdad and elsewhere face escalating terror attacks from the insurgency. If violence directed against Shi'ites demands a more public show of force by the Mehdi Army, it may be forced to break cover and risk becoming targets of U.S. firepower.
The more immediate concern for the surge strategy is not the maneuvers of militias commanders, but the fact that the loyalty of government security forces is dubious, at best. The Mehdi Army's most important stronghold may not, in fact, be Sadr City as such, but rather its legion of supporters inside government ministries, army units and police stations.'Startling moment': Bush's 'interest' referenced at leak trial
- Countdown, correspondent David Shuster, Feb 6, 2007 -MSNBC Countdown - PODCAST- 02-06-2007-172038
Excerpts
Excerpts
"There was one other very startling moment, referring to President Bush, in Scooter Libby‘s Grand Jury testimony on audiotape. Libby noted on a piece of paper a notation, and prosecutors asked whether the notation shows that President Bush was interested in the Kristof article on the State of the Union," Shuster said. "It was a Kristof article in May of 2003 which first got the White House thinking about Ambassador Wilson, because it talked about an ambassador‘s trip, which essentially undercut the State of the Union speech."
Shuster continued, "Libby was asked about the president‘s interest and he said, yes, that‘s what my notes signals, but Libby then went on to testify he never discussed the president‘s interest with the vice president, nor did Libby speak about it with President Bush. He went on to testify that he only heard about the president‘s interest from a senior staff meeting. Of course, we don‘t know if Libby was telling the truth, but it was certainly a tantalizing bit of testimony."
STEWART: For the first time today, a federal jury heard from Vice President Cheney‘s former right hand man, Lewis Scooter Libby, in his own words. On tapes, Libby said it was none other than Mr. Cheney himself who first told Libby that the wife of ambassador Joe Wilson was a CIA operative. Wilson, of course, is the man who publicly questioned the administration‘s justification for war in Iraq.
And that‘s not all Libby said. It‘s an eight hour tape of his 2004 Grand Jury testimony. Our number three story tonight, part of Libby‘s ongoing trial on charges he lied to cover up the leak of Valerie Plame Wilson‘s identity. More of the tape will be played in court tomorrow, after which the entire tape will be released to the public.
Libby‘s lawyers had fought against the release, but the judge ruled that all eight hours, audio tape only, can and will be made public despite his reservations that the tapes might just end up on TV. You think? We‘ll get to those first revelations in a moment.
But earlier in the day, Libby‘s lawyers tried to show the jury that anyone can make a mistake in testimony, pressing FBI agent Debra Bond on differences between her notes and her verbal accounts of Libby‘s statements to investigators. Covering the trial today, as he has since the start, is MSNBC‘s David Shuster.
David, we still don‘t know whether Libby will testify at trial, but in court today, what did you and the jury hear from those tapes?
DAVID SHUSTER, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT: Alison, it was very interesting. Among other things, we heard Scooter Libby testify about a conversation that he had with Vice President Cheney in June of 2003. This was a conversation where Scooter Libby wrote notes to himself about the phone conversation and then these notes were turned over to investigators.
And on the notes Libby indicates that Vice President Cheney told him that Valerie Wilson worked at the CIA in the counter proliferation division. Libby was asked by prosecutors then, during the Grand Jury, if this was the first time, June of 2003, that he learned about Valerie Wilson and Libby said, yes.
Libby was then asked about other government officials, where there are no Libby notes of his conversations. These are officials who have already testified in the case that they had a discussion with Scooter Libby about Valerie Wilson, also in June of 2003. When Libby was asked about those conversations, he kept repeating in a very soft voice, I do not recall.
The defense wants the jury to believe that Libby forgot about all of these June conversations so thoroughly that when he spoke with Tim Russert in July, and learned from Russert, according to Libby, about Valerie Wilson, even though Russert denies that, that somehow Libby was surprised to learn about Valerie Wilson.
The defense is also trying to show that Scooter Libby can‘t remember any previous discussions about Valerie Wilson except for the one involving Vice President Cheney, which is of course the only conversation where there is actual physical testimony from Scooter Libby and that is his own handwritten notes. That‘s how difficult the challenge is for the defense in this case.
There was one other very startling moment, referring to President Bush, in Scooter Libby‘s Grand Jury testimony on audiotape, Libby noted on a piece of paper, a notation, and prosecutors asked whether the notation shows that President Bush was interested in the Kristof article in the State of the Union. It was a Kristof article in May of 2003 which first got the White House thinking about Ambassador Wilson, because it talked about an ambassador‘s trip, which essentially undercut the State of the Union speech.
Libby was asked about the president‘s interest and he said, yes, that‘s what my notes signals, but Libby then went on to testify he never discussed the president‘s interest with the vice president, nor did Libby speak about it with President Bush. He went on to testify that he only heard about the president‘s interest from a senior staff meeting. Of course, we don‘t know if Libby was telling the truth, but it was certainly a tantalizing bit of testimony.
STEWART: This morning Libby‘s lawyers had FBI agent Debra Bond on the defensive, suggesting the differences between her notes and her testimony were analogous to the differences in Libby‘s situation. Can you flesh that out for us?
SHUSTER: Yes, Debra Bond was one of the first FBI agents who spoke to Libby when the criminal investigation and the CIA leak began. And she summarized in this trial Libby‘s statements to the FBI before Libby actually testified to the Grand Jury. And Bond testified last week, on direct, that Libby, quote, adamantly denied telling White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer anything about Valerie Wilson before Valerie Wilson was outed.
But under cross-examination today, by the defense, Bond acknowledged that the words adamantly denied were her characterization, and that Libby never used those words, but rather that Libby actually said he couldn‘t recall discussing Valerie Wilson with Ari Fleischer. It is a difference, so give the defense some credit, but again these are differences over shades of gray. This is not a blockbuster contradiction perhaps that the defense had been hoping for, Alison.
STEWART: OK, that was today. Let‘s look forward to tomorrow. Tell us what we‘re looking to.
SHUSTER: Yes, tomorrow we‘ll be looking for six and a half hours of Grand Jury audiotapes, in which there are three criminal counts against Scooter Libby, which are related to these sections of his Grand Jury testimony.
The first, of course, is Libby‘s testimony under oath that he only first learned about Valerie Wilson from NBC‘s Tim Russert, even though Tim Russert denies that, and also, even though Scooter Libby had already learned about Valerie Wilson a month earlier from Vice President Cheney, according to his own testimony.
The second crucial chunk of Libby‘s Grand Jury testimony involves a conversation with “Time Magazine‘s” Matt Cooper. Libby denied that he provided confirmation to Cooper about Valerie Wilson, even though Matt Cooper testified that Libby did provide that confirmation.
And then the third thing that we‘re watching for, that could be really dramatic, Alison, and that is: there has been a lot of testimony about a conversation that Libby and Vice President Cheney had on June 12, 2003. Again this is just a couple days before Valerie Wilson was outed. We‘re looking to see what the testimony is from Scooter Libby about that conversation, what did the vice president say to him, because there has already been some evidence suggesting that Libby and Vice President Cheney may have actually talked about leaking Valerie Wilson‘s identity to reporters.
So we‘ll be watching for that as well.
STEWART: David Shuster, thanks for all the details.
SHUSTER: You‘re welcome.
'Startling moment': Bush's 'interest' referenced at leak trial
- Countdown, correspondent David Shuster, Feb 6, 2007 -MSNBC Countdown - PODCAST- 02-06-2007-172038
Excerpts
Excerpts
"There was one other very startling moment, referring to President Bush, in Scooter Libby‘s Grand Jury testimony on audiotape. Libby noted on a piece of paper a notation, and prosecutors asked whether the notation shows that President Bush was interested in the Kristof article on the State of the Union," Shuster said. "It was a Kristof article in May of 2003 which first got the White House thinking about Ambassador Wilson, because it talked about an ambassador‘s trip, which essentially undercut the State of the Union speech."
Shuster continued, "Libby was asked about the president‘s interest and he said, yes, that‘s what my notes signals, but Libby then went on to testify he never discussed the president‘s interest with the vice president, nor did Libby speak about it with President Bush. He went on to testify that he only heard about the president‘s interest from a senior staff meeting. Of course, we don‘t know if Libby was telling the truth, but it was certainly a tantalizing bit of testimony."
STEWART: For the first time today, a federal jury heard from Vice President Cheney‘s former right hand man, Lewis Scooter Libby, in his own words. On tapes, Libby said it was none other than Mr. Cheney himself who first told Libby that the wife of ambassador Joe Wilson was a CIA operative. Wilson, of course, is the man who publicly questioned the administration‘s justification for war in Iraq.
And that‘s not all Libby said. It‘s an eight hour tape of his 2004 Grand Jury testimony. Our number three story tonight, part of Libby‘s ongoing trial on charges he lied to cover up the leak of Valerie Plame Wilson‘s identity. More of the tape will be played in court tomorrow, after which the entire tape will be released to the public.
Libby‘s lawyers had fought against the release, but the judge ruled that all eight hours, audio tape only, can and will be made public despite his reservations that the tapes might just end up on TV. You think? We‘ll get to those first revelations in a moment.
But earlier in the day, Libby‘s lawyers tried to show the jury that anyone can make a mistake in testimony, pressing FBI agent Debra Bond on differences between her notes and her verbal accounts of Libby‘s statements to investigators. Covering the trial today, as he has since the start, is MSNBC‘s David Shuster.
David, we still don‘t know whether Libby will testify at trial, but in court today, what did you and the jury hear from those tapes?
DAVID SHUSTER, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT: Alison, it was very interesting. Among other things, we heard Scooter Libby testify about a conversation that he had with Vice President Cheney in June of 2003. This was a conversation where Scooter Libby wrote notes to himself about the phone conversation and then these notes were turned over to investigators.
And on the notes Libby indicates that Vice President Cheney told him that Valerie Wilson worked at the CIA in the counter proliferation division. Libby was asked by prosecutors then, during the Grand Jury, if this was the first time, June of 2003, that he learned about Valerie Wilson and Libby said, yes.
Libby was then asked about other government officials, where there are no Libby notes of his conversations. These are officials who have already testified in the case that they had a discussion with Scooter Libby about Valerie Wilson, also in June of 2003. When Libby was asked about those conversations, he kept repeating in a very soft voice, I do not recall.
The defense wants the jury to believe that Libby forgot about all of these June conversations so thoroughly that when he spoke with Tim Russert in July, and learned from Russert, according to Libby, about Valerie Wilson, even though Russert denies that, that somehow Libby was surprised to learn about Valerie Wilson.
The defense is also trying to show that Scooter Libby can‘t remember any previous discussions about Valerie Wilson except for the one involving Vice President Cheney, which is of course the only conversation where there is actual physical testimony from Scooter Libby and that is his own handwritten notes. That‘s how difficult the challenge is for the defense in this case.
There was one other very startling moment, referring to President Bush, in Scooter Libby‘s Grand Jury testimony on audiotape, Libby noted on a piece of paper, a notation, and prosecutors asked whether the notation shows that President Bush was interested in the Kristof article in the State of the Union. It was a Kristof article in May of 2003 which first got the White House thinking about Ambassador Wilson, because it talked about an ambassador‘s trip, which essentially undercut the State of the Union speech.
Libby was asked about the president‘s interest and he said, yes, that‘s what my notes signals, but Libby then went on to testify he never discussed the president‘s interest with the vice president, nor did Libby speak about it with President Bush. He went on to testify that he only heard about the president‘s interest from a senior staff meeting. Of course, we don‘t know if Libby was telling the truth, but it was certainly a tantalizing bit of testimony.
STEWART: This morning Libby‘s lawyers had FBI agent Debra Bond on the defensive, suggesting the differences between her notes and her testimony were analogous to the differences in Libby‘s situation. Can you flesh that out for us?
SHUSTER: Yes, Debra Bond was one of the first FBI agents who spoke to Libby when the criminal investigation and the CIA leak began. And she summarized in this trial Libby‘s statements to the FBI before Libby actually testified to the Grand Jury. And Bond testified last week, on direct, that Libby, quote, adamantly denied telling White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer anything about Valerie Wilson before Valerie Wilson was outed.
But under cross-examination today, by the defense, Bond acknowledged that the words adamantly denied were her characterization, and that Libby never used those words, but rather that Libby actually said he couldn‘t recall discussing Valerie Wilson with Ari Fleischer. It is a difference, so give the defense some credit, but again these are differences over shades of gray. This is not a blockbuster contradiction perhaps that the defense had been hoping for, Alison.
STEWART: OK, that was today. Let‘s look forward to tomorrow. Tell us what we‘re looking to.
SHUSTER: Yes, tomorrow we‘ll be looking for six and a half hours of Grand Jury audiotapes, in which there are three criminal counts against Scooter Libby, which are related to these sections of his Grand Jury testimony.
The first, of course, is Libby‘s testimony under oath that he only first learned about Valerie Wilson from NBC‘s Tim Russert, even though Tim Russert denies that, and also, even though Scooter Libby had already learned about Valerie Wilson a month earlier from Vice President Cheney, according to his own testimony.
The second crucial chunk of Libby‘s Grand Jury testimony involves a conversation with “Time Magazine‘s” Matt Cooper. Libby denied that he provided confirmation to Cooper about Valerie Wilson, even though Matt Cooper testified that Libby did provide that confirmation.
And then the third thing that we‘re watching for, that could be really dramatic, Alison, and that is: there has been a lot of testimony about a conversation that Libby and Vice President Cheney had on June 12, 2003. Again this is just a couple days before Valerie Wilson was outed. We‘re looking to see what the testimony is from Scooter Libby about that conversation, what did the vice president say to him, because there has already been some evidence suggesting that Libby and Vice President Cheney may have actually talked about leaking Valerie Wilson‘s identity to reporters.
So we‘ll be watching for that as well.
STEWART: David Shuster, thanks for all the details.
SHUSTER: You‘re welcome.
New Report Spells Out Catastrophic Consequences Of Military Action Against Iran
The document, entitled “Time To Talk: The Case For Diplomatic Solutions On Iran,” warns that President Bush “feels duty-bound to stop Iran’s nuclear program. With little faith in diplomacy, the use of US military force remains a possibility, since Bush believes it unlikely that a…successor will have the ‘political courage’ to undertake a military strike.” There will likely be “great pressure on the President either to contemplate military action before he leaves office or to give the green light to Israeli strikes,” the report states.
The consequences of a U.S. or Israeli strike are “potentially so serious that complacency about the possible outcomes of a military strike could be perilous.” The report attacks “the assumption that targeted military strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations would effectively set back Iran’s nuclear program in the mid-to-long term.” Among the scenarios that the report lays out:
The underlying message is that, while the threat from Iran is serious and negotiations are difficult, “it cannot be said that the potential for diplomacy has been explored fully when direct talks between Iran and the US have not taken place.”
Filed under: Iran
Posted by Faiz February 6, 2007 3:32 pm
Cost of troop buildup not in budget
2008 SPENDING PROPOSAL: MILITARY, HEALTHCARE
click to enlarge
But Defense officials could not provide assurances Monday that the troop level would fall back again by next year, and acknowledged they may be forced to return to Congress for more money to pay for the extra forces if sectarian conflict continues to rage.
In unveiling the Defense Department's budget request, Tina Jonas, the Pentagon budget director, told reporters that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates provided instructions to treat the troop increase as "a near-term initiative" that would not need to be accounted for in the 2008 budget. But Jonas acknowledged those assumptions could change.
"I think we know that it will be wrong," Jonas said of the war-cost estimate.
"Obviously, things will change and we'll have to adjust at that point."
President Bush announced last month that he would send 21,500 additional U.S. troops to Iraq to help stem violence, a move that was widely criticized in Congress and met with disapproval by the American public.
The issue of how long the troop level will remain higher is highly sensitive within the Pentagon as well, with apparent disagreements over its size and duration occurring even between the outgoing and incoming commanders in Iraq.
$725 billion for defense
The $142-billion war budget submitted Monday was part of a complicated defense spending package that surpassed $725 billion. It also included $481 billion for non-war defense spending in 2008 and a $93-billion supplemental request for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through the remainder of 2007.
Added to $70 billion approved last year for 2007 war spending, the extra $93 billion requested by Bush would bring this year's war spending total to $163 billion.
Congressional Democrats charged that, even without money for the additional troops, the war funding request is so high that it shows that the White House has no intention of reducing the U.S. presence in Iraq before next year's presidential election.
"The new funding requests for the war in Iraq submitted today give the American people no hope that President Bush has plans to reduce our military involvement in Iraq for the foreseeable future — in fact, just the opposite," said House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco).
The 2008 budget — which covers the fiscal year, October 2007 through September 2008 — includes projections that show war spending dropping to $50 billion in 2009.
Bush hastened to say that that projection did not foretell a reduction in the U.S. presence, and administration officials said the 2009 figure was seen as a "placeholder" to be adjusted in the future.
The Pentagon said Bush's decision to increase troops in Iraq would cost $5.6 billion through the end of 2007, a figure that officials said would cover the buildup for at least eight months. That was well below a Congressional Budget Office estimate issued last week that argued the cost could spiral to $27 billion for a yearlong buildup because of the number of support personnel needed to deploy an additional 21,500 combat troops.
Long-term plans
Even without the additional funding for the escalation in 2008, however, there were signs of the administration's commitment to a long-term presence in Iraq in their budget proposals, including hundreds of millions of dollars for military bases in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The 2007 portion of the budget includes a $318-million request for construction in Iraq, most of which will fund projects on two of the military's huge bases within the country: Al Asad Air Base in western Anbar province and Balad Air Base north of Baghdad.
It also asks for $650 million for military construction in Afghanistan, nearly half of it for projects at Bagram Air Base, the sprawling facility north of Kabul that serves as the military's prime operations center in the country.
In testimony shortly after becoming Defense secretary, Gates told the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. did not want permanent bases in Iraq. But both Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill remain skeptical. Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Oakland) reintroduced legislation last month that would prevent the U.S. from establishing permanent bases in Iraq, a bill that has in the past garnered bipartisan support.
Despite the prospect of continued high troop levels in Iraq, the budget also assumes the Iraqi security forces will begin to take over more responsibilities by next year.
U.S. funding for the Iraqi security forces would rise 83% in 2007, to $5.5 billion, under the new proposals. But the funding would drop to $2 billion in 2008. By that time, according to budget documents, the Pentagon assumes the government of Iraq "will have taken on primary financial responsibility for sustaining the Iraqi security forces."
Afghan forces would get an even larger influx of funding in the proposed budget: $7.4 billion for the Afghan army and police, nearly triple last year's amount. However, funding for security forces is due to drop to $2.7 billion by 2008.
The Pentagon also for the first time detailed the cost of increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps over the next five years, saying the additional 92,000 soldiers and Marines would add $117.6 billion through 2013. That includes $5.3 billion to be spent this year and an additional $18.6 billion for 2008.
peter.spiegel@latimes.com
Times staff writer Julian E. Barnes contributed to this report.
Cheney’s Son-In-Law Blamed for Delaying Investigations of Homeland Security Department
Walker said the DHS strategy in dealing with investigations is to “delay, delay, delay.” CongressDaily reports:
“[Homeland Security] has been one of our persistent access challenges,” GAO Comptroller General David Walker told the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee. Walker said the problem is “systemic” and not the fault of any single individual. But he complained that GAO has had to go through the office of Chief Counsel Philip Perry. Perry is married to Elizabeth Cheney, a former State Department official who is one of the vice president’s two daughters. Walker said it is his understanding that Perry’s office has to review documents GAO seeks before they are released and that Perry selectively sits in on interviews with department employees.
The GAO’s Skinner “said his investigations have also been hindered”:
“We’re experiencing the same problem,” said Skinner, who added his office is “oftentimes” told who they can interview and that it sometimes takes weeks to get documents. Skinner said he prepared a document last summer to inform all department employees of the IG’s responsibilities and authorities and encouraging them to cooperate with investigations. “That letter has been sitting up in counsel’s office at DHS since I believe June or July of ‘06,” Skinner said.
The news is another in a series of black eyes for the agency. In a recent federal survey, DHS employees “scored last or almost last in job satisfaction, leadership and workplace performance.” The latest semiannual report from Inspector General Skinner highlighted “a litany of staff misconduct: immigration officials demanding sex in exchange for visas, airport screeners stealing money from tourists’ luggage, federal air marshals smuggling drugs, and employees from various DHS agencies committing sex crimes.”
Filed under: Homeland Security
Posted by Payson February 6, 2007 4:18 pm
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)