Iran invasion costs would dwarf those in Iraq

Tuesday January 30 2007

As tension rises between the US and Iran, Econbrowser provides a useful overview of the economic fallout of any US military strike against Iran.

The blog cites a 54-page report from the US thinktank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, written by Anthony Cordesman - one of Washington's best armchair generals - and Khali al-Rodhan.

Called Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military Strikes, the study indicates that discussion of a military attack against Iran well predated the Bush administration's sabre-rattling against Tehran of past weeks.

After running through various scenarios, from limited effect on oil prices (best case) to a closure of the Straits of Hormuz (worst case), Econbrowser concludes: "In sum, the expected value of the costs associated with military action in Iran would likely dwarf the direct fiscal and non-pecuniary costs that we have already incurred in Iraq."

As part of its campaign to isolate Iran, the US is putting pressure on European countries to cut economic and financial ties with Iran. But as the International Herald Tribune reports, European governments are dragging their feet in freezing Iranian assets or blocking transactions between European and Iranian banks.

David Seaton's Newslinks picks up on an agreement signed over the weekend by Royal Dutch Shell and Iran that could lead to a multi-billion dollar investment in Iran, which has not gone down well with the US.

"Europe is not willing to sacrifice strategic energy supplies to make life easier for a lame duck American president whose short hairs appear to be in the possession of the Israeli Likud... Does this gang of idiots actually have the chops to sanction European flagship, Royal Dutch Shell?"

By Mark Tran / USA 03:02pm

The other Iraq report

Eye on Iraq
By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 (UPI) -- A new report published Monday documents grim confirmation of the most pessimistic assessments we have made in these columns over the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq during the past 10 months.

Ever since Shiite militias across Iraq erupted into a frenzy of retaliatory random killings of Sunnis following the bombing of the al-Askariya, or Golden Mosque in Samara -- a cherished Shiite shrine -- on Feb. 22, 2006, we have charted and predicted in these columns the California-sized nation of 28 million people's rapid descent into a state of violent chaos. In the words of the great 17th century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, life in Iraq has become nasty, brutish and short."

The new report, entitled "Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and Evolving Insurgency: Developments through mid-December 2006" is by Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

The 92-page report was released to none of the media hoopla and obsession that greeted the Iraq Study Group report chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III and former Democratic congressman Lee Hamilton. But it is even more frank and harsh in its assessments of the current chaos in Iraq than the ISG document.

The CSIS report acknowledged what we predicted and then saw confirmed in the fall: that the ill-fated U.S.-led Operation Together Forward II in Baghdad had only made "slow progress in clearing the volatile neighborhoods, and the initiative lacked sufficient forces to maintain peace in cleared areas"

"Baghdad was the center of the sectarian conflict, but violence spread to surrounding towns -- particularly Baquba, Balad, and Amara -- as the civil war threatened to engulf the entire country," the report said.

Cordesman noted that the United Nations had concluded that by mid-December, sectarian violence was killing 120 Iraqis a day. Back in the spring, we warned that the escalating violence by that point was on schedule to kill more than 30,000 people a year in Iraq., even if things did not get any worse.

Cordesman has now confirmed things have gotten worse than that. The U.N. figures he cites mean that even if the current levels of violence in Iraq do not deteriorate further (in fact they show every sign of doing so) 43,800 people will die next year there at the current rates of carnage.

Cordesman also confirmed our repeated warnings in these columns that the violence in Iraq was not divided along simple, clear-cut Sunni versus Shiite or "Sunni insurgent versus U.S. and Iraqi armed forces" lines, but that it reflected a splintered country where every neighborhood or district had its own different groups at odds with their geographical neighbors as well as their immediate ethnic rivals

"Sectarian fighting, led by the growth of some 23 militias around Baghdad, formed the foundation of the civil war," Cordesman wrote.

Among the Shiite militias, the Badr Brigades and the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr are locked in what promises to be an extremely bloody struggle for supremacy within the Shiite camp. But plenty of smaller allied and independent Shiite militias are vying for power and survival too.

And even the biggest militias are not monolithic or well-disciplined, coherent entities. Instead, they are full of violent, semi-independent factions endlessly vying for supremacy over each other as well as their wider enemies.

Cordesman confirmed this development too. "Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army developed rogue components that acted outside of his command. Sunnis formed loosely organized neighborhood death squads in the urban areas, some with ties to al-Qaida or ex-Baathist groups," he wrote.

Cordesman also confirmed the prediction we made back in April that the U.S armed forces, the Department of Defense and the Bush administration had yet to recognize the fundamental truth that what we called "Belfast Rules" or Beirut Rules" now operated across Iraq, especially in Baghdad.

"Baghdad and other major cities were almost completely divided into sectarian strongholds as both Sunnis and Shia fled neighborhoods in which they were a minority," Cordesman wrote. "Soft ethnic cleansing forced upwards of 400,000 Iraqis to relocate within Iraq since the February Samara mosque bombing."

Cordesman also noted that the Sunni Arab insurgency "remained focused in the western Anbar Province and benefited from the relocation of U.S. troops to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad."
And finally, Cordesman confirmed our conclusion in these columns that, far from creating a stable political basis for an effective democratic government in Iraq, the genuinely free democratic elections and the cumbersome parliamentary system that was created by them have made sectarian tensions far worse, not better.

By mid-December, "Tensions between Sunni and Shiite legislators reached an all time high as both sects accused each other of propagating sectarian killings by supporting death squads," he wrote.

Cordesman is no alarmist, defeatist, or amateur. He is one of the most respected, traditionally cautious and respected military analysts in Washington. His assessment reflects a sober, new mainstream consensus in the U.S. capital. The new secretary of defense, Robert Gates, who was sworn in on Monday, appears to privately share it. About the last person who doesn't is the president of the United States.

One War We Can Still Win?

Center Strategic & Int’l Studies: One War We Can Still Win

AUTHOR: Anthony H. Cordesman - SourceWatch is employed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

SOME KEY POINTS

NO one can return from visiting the front in Afghanistan without realizing there is a very real risk that the United States and NATO will lose this war. Popular support for the United States and NATO teams has been strong and can be rebuilt.

The United States’ and NATO’s focus on democracy and the political process in Kabul — rather than on the quality of governance and on services — has left many areas angry and open to hostile influence. As one Afghan deputy minister put it to me during my trip: “Now we are all corrupt. Until we change and serve the people, we will fail.”

At one police unit, policemen were sometimes not paid at all, leaving them no choice but to extort a living.

The United States has grossly underfinanced such economic aid efforts and left far too much of the country without visible aid activity. The maps of actual and proposed projects covers only a small part of the country. Even a short visit to some of the districts in the southeast, near the border with Pakistan, suggests that most areas have not seen any progress.

State Department plans call for a $2.3 billion program, but unless at least $1.1 billion comes immediately, aid will lag far behind need next year. The United States team has made an urgent request for $5.9 billion in extra money this fiscal year, which probably underestimates immediate need.

At least such programs are cheap by the standards of aid to Iraq. The projects needed are simple ones that Afghans can largely carry out themselves: roads and water, and to a lesser degree schools and medical services. They need emergency aid to meet local needs and win hearts and minds.

And United States military forces are too small to do the job - it needs at least two more infantry battalions, and increases in Special Forces.

NATO must exercise effective central command; it cannot win with politically constrained forces, and it must pressure the stand-aside countries to join the fight.

The good news is that there is a new realism in the United States and NATO effort.

--------------------------------------------

One War We Can Still Win

NO one can return from visiting the front in Afghanistan without realizing there is a very real risk that the United States and NATO will lose their war with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the other Islamist movements fighting the Afghan government.

STATE OF SECURITY

Declassified intelligence made available during my recent trip there showed that major Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami sanctuaries exist in Pakistan, and that the areas they operate in, within Afghanistan have increased fourfold over the last year.

Indeed, a great many unhappy trends have picked up speed lately (the first 11 months of 2005 to 116 in the first 11 months of 2006.):

suicide attacks: rose from 18 to 116

direct fire attacks: rose from 1,347 to 3,824

IED attackss: from 530 to 1,297

other attacks: from 269 to 479.

attacks on Afghan forces: from 713 to 2,892,

attacks on coalition forces: from 919 to 2,496 and

attacks on Afghan officials: rose 2.5 times

Only the extensive use of American air power and intelligence assets has allowed the United States to win this year’s battles in the east.

In the south, Britain has been unable to prevent a major increase in the Taliban’s presence.

STATE OF POPULAR OPINION

The challenges in Afghanistan, however, are very different from those in Iraq. Popular support for the United States and NATO teams has been strong and can be rebuilt. The present United States aid efforts are largely sound and well managed, and they can make immediate and effective use of more money. [SEE: US Inspector General: Afghan Police Corrupt and Dysfunctional (NY Times)]

The Islamist threat is weak, but it is growing in strength — political as well as military. The Afghan government will take years to become effective, reduce corruption to acceptable levels and replace a narcotics-based economy. As one Afghan deputy minister put it to me during my trip: “Now we are all corrupt. Until we change and serve the people, we will fail.” [SEE: Taliban fill void left by Kabul corruption (Houston Chronicle) ]

STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

No matter what the outside world does, Afghans, the United States team and NATO representatives all agree that change will take time. The present central government is at least two or three years away from providing the presence and services Afghans desperately need. The United States’ and NATO’s focus on democracy and the political process in Kabul — rather than on the quality of governance and on services — has left many areas angry and open to hostile influence. Afghanistan is going to need large amounts of military and economic aid, much of it managed from the outside in ways that ensure it actually gets to Afghans, particularly in the areas where the threat is greatest. [SEE: Action Against Hunger: 5 yrs after the Taliban – what about Afghanis? ]

This means the United States needs to make major increases in its economic aid, as do its NATO allies. These increases need to be made immediately if new projects and meaningful actions are to begin in the field by the end of winter, when the Islamists typically launch new offensives. [SEE: UN Racing to Supply Food Before Snowfall ]

At least such programs are cheap by the standards of aid to Iraq. The projects needed are simple ones that Afghans can largely carry out themselves. People need roads and water, and to a lesser degree schools and medical services. They need emergency aid to meet local needs and win hearts and minds.

The maps of actual and proposed projects make it clear that while progress is real, it covers only a small part of the country. Even a short visit to some of the districts in the southeast, near the border with Pakistan, suggests that most areas have not seen any progress.

Drought adds to the problem, much of the old irrigation system has collapsed, and roads are little more than paths. The central government cannot offer hope, and local officials and the police cannot compete with drug loans and income.

The United States has grossly underfinanced such economic aid efforts and left far too much of the country without visible aid activity. State Department plans call for a $2.3 billion program, but unless at least $1.1 billion comes immediately, aid will lag far behind need next year.

Additionally, a generous five-year aid plan from both the United States and its NATO allies is needed for continuity and effectiveness. The United States is carrying far too much of the burden, and NATO allies, particularly France, Germany, Italy and Spain, are falling short: major aid increases are needed from each.

HUMPTY-DUMPTY SYNDROME: MORE GUNS & MORE BOOTS

And United States military forces are too small to do the job. Competing demands in Iraq have led to a military climate where American troops plan for what they can get, not what they need. The 10th Mountain Division, which is responsible for eastern Afghanistan, has asked for one more infantry brigade. This badly understates need, even if new Polish forces help in the east. The United States must be able to hold and build as well as win — it needs at least two more infantry battalions, and increases in Special Forces. These increases are tiny by comparison with American forces in Iraq, but they can make all the difference.

The NATO allies must provide stronger and better-equipped forces that will join the fight and go where they are most needed. The British fight well but have only 50 to 75 percent of the forces they need. Canadians, Danes, Estonians, Dutch and Romanians are in the fight. The Poles lack adequate equipment but are willing to fight. France, Italy, Germany, Spain and Turkey are not allowed to fight because of political constraints and rules of engagement. Only French Special Forces have played any role in combat and they depart in January. NATO must exercise effective central command; it cannot win with politically constrained forces, and it must pressure the stand-aside countries to join the fight. [SEE: NATO Summit – EU Suspends US Dreams ]

Finally, the United States and NATO have repeated the same mistakes that were made in Iraq in developing effective Afghan Army and police forces, rushing unready forces into combat. The manning of key Afghan army battalions is sometimes below 25 percent and the police units are often unpaid. Corruption and pay problems are still endemic, equipment and facilities inadequate. Overall financing has been about 20 percent of the real-world requirement, and talks with Afghan and NATO officials made it brutally clear that the Germans wasted years trying to create a conventional police force rather than the mix of paramilitary and local police forces Afghanistan really needs.

A PROGNOSIS

The good news is that there is a new realism in the United States and NATO effort. The planning, training and much of the necessary base has been built up during the last year. There are effective plans in place, along with the NATO and American staffs to help put them into effect. [SEE: UK Military Chiefs: CIA is undermining British war effort ]

The bad news is the same crippling lack of resources that affect every part of the United States and NATO efforts also affect the development of the Afghan Army and police. [SEE: US Inspector General: Afghan Police Corrupt and Dysfunctional (NY Times)]

It was obvious during a visit to one older Afghan Army battalion that it had less than a quarter of its authorized manpower, and only one man in five was expected to re-enlist. At one police unit, although policemen were supposed to be paid quarterly, they were sometimes not paid at all, leaving them no choice but to extort a living. (In one case, the officer in charge of pay didn’t even fill out forms because he had been passed over for promotion because of his ethnicity.)

The United States team has made an urgent request for $5.9 billion in extra money this fiscal year, which probably underestimates immediate need and in any event must be followed by an integrated long-term economic aid plan. There is no time for the administration and Congress to quibble or play budget games.

And, once again, the NATO countries must make major increases in aid as well.

In Iraq, the failure of the United States and the allies to honestly assess problems in the field, be realistic about needs, create effective long-term aid and force-development plans, and emphasize governance over services may well have brought defeat.

The United States and its allies cannot afford to lose two wars. If they do not act now, they will.