The Iraq situation is worse than a civil war.
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POLITICS-US/IRAQ:
Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON, Feb 2 (IPS) - A long-awaited study by the U.S. intelligence community released here Friday concludes there is little, if any, light at the end of tunnel in Iraq.
The report, which comes on the eve of an unprecedented Senate debate on President George W. Bush's plan to add at least 21,500 more troops to the 140,000 U.S. forces already in Iraq, described the current conflict there as a "civil war" that could very easily lead to the country's de facto partition.
Moreover, even if the additional U.S. troops succeed in reducing the violence over the next year to 18 months, progress toward reaching a political settlement is doubtful given attitudes among the various Iraqi communities and their leaders, according to the report's "Key Judgments", the only part of the report that was released publicly.
"(E)ven if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate," according to the report, called a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)."
The NIE, which has been six months in preparation and represents the consensus views of the vast U.S. intelligence community, also stressed the violence in Iraq is internally generated and sustained, refuting recent suggestions by the senior Bush administration officials that Iran is playing a major role in support of Shi'a militias.
"Iran's neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq's internal sectarian dynamics," it said, adding that Iranian "lethal support" for some Shi'a groups "clearly intensifies the conflict and that Syria has taken "less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq".
Bush's national security adviser Steven Hadley, embraced the NIE's key judgments, insisting as well that the intelligence on which it was based had been fully considered by the president in devising his new strategy, including the increase in U.S. combat strength in Iraq, that he announced Jan 10.
"We think it is accurate," he said about the report's grim analysis, even as he demurred over the characterisation of the conflict as a "civil war. "(T)he intelligence assessment that is reflected in this NIE is not at war with the new approach... the president has developed, but I would say explains why the president concluded that a new strategy was required," he told reporters.
But critics said deep pessimism reflected in the report raised new questions about whether Bush's the addition of more troops would make much difference.
"(R)ather than convincing me that (Bush's new strategy) is the right approach, the NIE makes it more clear than ever that the president's plan has little chance of success," said Rep. Ike Skelton, chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee, who has called for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops over the next year.
Indeed, at this point, it is difficult to predict how the NIE will affect the growing debate -- and dissent -- in Congress, including among Republicans, over Bush's plan to send more troops.
The Senate will take up several non-binding resolutions early next week, including one, authored by the former Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that is considered the most likely to gain a strong bipartisan majority. It explicitly disagrees with Bush's plan.
Another report, released late Thursday by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), has already weakened Bush's position by asserting that his plan, which the administration has repeatedly insisted will send only 21,500 troops, will likely result in many more -- as many as 48,000 -- going to Iraq when support units are counted.
In contrast to administration estimates that its planned troop 'surge" would cost under six billion dollars, the CBO placed the more likely figure at between 20 billion dollars and 27 billion dollars a year depending on how many support troops were involved. Washington is currently spending about eight billion dollars a month on Iraq operations.
Aside from its remarkably grim assessment of the current situation and how it is likely to evolve over the next 12 to 18 months, the new NIE's judgments offers some ammunition to the administration, notably its assertion that "Coalition capabilities... remain an essential stabilising element in Iraq and its prediction for what is likely to happen in the even of a "rapid withdrawal" of U.S. and other "coalition" forces during the same period.
"We judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation," according to the report.
It warned that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would be "unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institutions" and the possibility that neighbouring countries "might intervene openly in the conflict." It also said "massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable" and that Al Qaeda in Iraq would try to establish bases in parts of the country.
While those predictions large echo those by Bush and other senior officials, however, the NIE did not define what it means by "rapid withdrawal". Most Congressional critics of Bush policy oppose an "immediate withdrawal", while the bipartisan Iraq Study Group that was co-chaired by former secretary of state James Baker and former Rep. Lee Hamilton called for withdrawing all U.S. combat troops -- about 70,000 currently -- by April 2008.
At the same time, the report noted several developments that "Could (in italics) help to reverse the negative trends driving Iraq's current trajectory," including "broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism"; 'significant concessions by Shia and Kurds; and a "bottom-up approach" to achieving reconciliation among warring tribes and sects.
But the italicized "could" appeared to suggest considerable scepticism.
"These developmentsà are unlikely to emerge, and the authors probably knew that," according to Wayne White, an Iraq expert who served as deputy director of the State Department's Office of Middle East and South Asia Analysis until 2005. The Office is part of Bureau of Intelligence and Research, one of the 16 agencies that contributes to the NIE process. Whie said he considered the analysis in the Judgments to be "spot on."
A favourable outcome will depend on "stronger Iraqi leadership," the report stressed, noting at another point in the document: "The absence of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the capacity to speak for or exert control over their confessional groups limits prospects for reconciliation."
If some developments could help stabilise the situation, however, there are others, "including sustained mass sectarian killings, assassination of major religious and political leaders, and a complete Sunni defection from the government" that have "the potential to convulse severely Iraq's security environment," according to the report.
In that event, one of three outcomes is likely: "chaos leading to (de facto) partition, a scenario that "would generate fierce violence for at least several years;" the "emergence of a Shia strongman; or an "anarchic fragmentation of power" that would present "the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group clashes."
As for the current situation, the NIE concluded that "the term 'civil war' accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements." At the same time, it said authors said the term "does not adequately capture the complexity" of the various dimensions of the violence.
"They not only accept the term 'civil war' as a description of what's going on, but the way they put it suggests they see it as even worse, because of the other forms of violent conflict that are being pursued in addition to civil war," said Juan Cole, a Middle East expert at the University of Michigan and president of the Middle East Studies Association. "This is a refutation of the administration's stance in spade."
He told IPS he was struck by the "extreme pessimism" of the report. "It doesn't appear to envisage an easy or foreseeable end to the conflict absent factors which it says explicitly are not there today."
In his book The Persian Puzzle, Kenneth Pollack aptly frames the issue of Iran as a “race between two clocks”. One clock counts down the time until Iran enriches enough uranium to build a nuclear weapon. The other ticks off the hours that a corrupt clerical regime has left. The problem is that the alarm on the first clock seems set to go off before the alarm on the second.
A sensible way to think about policy towards Iran might be to consider ways to reverse that precedence – to stretch out the nuclear timetable, while encouraging the demise of an Iranian government bent on proliferation. Estimates of the time needed for Iran to assemble a bomb range from three to eight years. (The Iraqi example counsels scepticism about such forecasts.) Predicting the durability of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad’s rule, or the Islamic republic as a whole, is even trickier. Depending on which demise one is talking about, it could be a matter of months or of generations. But the outer edge of the proliferation schedule suggests that there may be a considerable window for political change to occur first.
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At the moment, the Bush administration’s policy seems taken straight from the self-sabotage strategy book – quite a thick volume when it comes to America’s relations with Iran. Were our goal to persuade the Iranian regime to hasten its nuclear race while binding it more closely to a weary and discontented populace, it is hard to see how we could be more effective.
Especially in the past month, American policy has been more about rattling sabres than carrots and sticks. In this week’s instalment, Vice-President Dick Cheney, who actually may be twisted enough to want a military confrontation, underscored that the aircraft carrier Stennis was being sent to the Persian Gulf as a “strong signal” of warning.
Such belligerence seems unlikely to produce the result we desire, for a variety of reasons. For one, our bluster is empty. The US lacks plausible military options for nuclear pre-emption, especially now that we are bogged down in Iraq. It is also proving difficult to get the rest of the world to go along with the kind of comprehensive sanctions that would truly bite. Meanwhile, US hostility is supplying Mr Ahmadi-Nejad with an external demon for his propaganda and helping him to cover over his domestic failures. This American push for futile sanctions follows the pattern extending from Cuba to Burma to pre-invasion Iraq, where economic isolation and external threat have fuelled not regime change but regime stabilisation.
What might an alternative strategy – one framed explicitly in terms of reversing the speed of the two clocks – look like? To begin with, it would emphasise America’s preference for diplomacy over brinkmanship. Condoleezza Rice, secretary of state, would embrace the “time out” deal recently proposed by Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under this proposal, Iran would suspend uranium enrichment while the US would hold off pushing punitive measures. The ultimate settlement would involve Iran’s abiding by the non-proliferation treaty and the dropping by the US not only of international sanctions but of bilateral ones as well.
Iran’s internal political dynamics are opaque, to say the least, but conciliation with the Great Satan would probably make it harder for Mr Ahmadi-Nejad to divert attention from the costs his people are paying for his mischief-making and his inability to reform the economy. But just as important as the effort in diplomacy would be a moral challenge focused on support for human rights, civil society and solidarity with the Iranian people, who are being bled for the sake of their president’s hegemonic designs.
We know well the effect this kind of stance can have. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who died in December, first became famous for an article she wrote arguing that former president Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights helped bring down the shah and usher in the Iranian revolution. As ambassador to the United Nations during Ronald Reagan’s first term, Ms Kirkpatrick herself eloquently challenged the legitimacy of totalitarian regimes. After the fall of communism, opposition leaders throughout eastern Europe and the Soviet Union testified that western encouragement – including from the BBC and Radio Free Europe – had advanced their struggle for liberation.
Mr Bush pays lip service to such sentiments, often hailing the greatness of the Iranian people and endorsing their assumed desire for freedom. But, for the past three years, the president has failed to mention in public the name of Shirin Ebadi, Iran’s Nobel Prize-winning human rights lawyer. Ms Ebadi is the closest thing Iran has to an Andrei Sakharov, but she is also a critic of the US administration. Because of sanctions, it took a lawsuit against the Treasury department for her to publish her memoirs in the US. No one in the White House raised a finger on her behalf.
But perhaps it would be worse if they had. Mr Bush, who has managed to make democracy a dirty word in many parts of the world, may at this point retain only the ability to taint by association liberal heroes who fight tyranny.
The only encouraging news is that Mr Bush’s own clock, with just 103 weeks left to run, is ticking even faster than the other two.
The writer is editor of Slate.com
eorge Soros lunched with some reporters on Saturday at Davos. He talked about spending $600 million on civil society projects during the 1990s, then trying to cut back to $300 million, and how this year it will be between $450 and $500 million. His new projects aim, in Floyd Norris's words, to promote a "common European foreign policy" (read: an anti-American foreign policy) and also to study the integration (or so he thinks) of Muslims in eleven European cities. He included among his dicta a little slight at Bill and Melinda Gates, who "have chosen public health, which is like apple pie." And then, after saying the United States was now recognizing the errors it made in Iraq, he added this comment, as reported by Norris in The New York Times' online "Davos Diary": "To what extent it recognizes the mistake will determine its future." Soros said Turkey and Japan were still hurt by a reluctance to admit to dark parts of their history and contrasted that reluctance to Germany's rejection of its Nazi-era past. "America needs to follow the policies it has introduced in Germany. We have to go through a certain deNazification process." 
hat makes Soros's remark even more twisted is that he himself experienced something of Nazism. He was 14 when the Nazis entered Budapest. On December 20, 1998, there appeared this exchange between Soros and Steve Kroft on "60 Minutes": 
oros is ostentatiously indifferent to his own Jewishness. He is not a believer. He has no Jewish communal ties. He certainly isn't a Zionist. He told Connie Bruck in The New Yorker--testily, she recounted--that "I don't deny the Jews their right to a national existence--but I don't want to be part of it." But he has involved himself in the founding of an anti-
