Will the "defeat" of the Bush administration in the recent elections cause a sea of change in US foreign policy? Maybe not.

The ripple effect

Will the "defeat" of the Bush administration in the recent elections cause a sea of change in US foreign policy? Maybe not, writes Gamil Mattar*


The Arabs are divided over the results of the US congressional elections. Some are plagued with guilt for having contributed to the damage caused to the Bush administration; others are worried over the growing schadenfreude towards that administration. Some are anxious over the consequences of the growing influence in Washington of bipartisan forces that hate Arabs and all they believe in. Others, conversely, are convinced that our luck will change with the Democratic control of Congress and that the worst period in our relations with the US is over.

The Arabs can be forgiven for having given more attention to the congressional election results than, for example, to the massacre in Beit Hanoun. After all, many of them say, we're all subject peoples of, or profoundly affected by, that far-flung, highly influential and extremely powerful empire, and it's only natural that what happens in its centre should overshadow our other concerns. I believe that many Europeans, Asians and other peoples were similarly distracted by those elections from events closer to home.

In common with people in London, Paris and Berlin, many Arabs are pondering the part they played in bringing about what has been widely described as Bush's defeat. I can perfectly well understand the logic of America's friends in the Arab world who fault their governments for not responding to the Bush administration's call to democratise and to initiate far-ranging and substantial political reforms. When Bush embarked on his Iraqi adventure, he proclaimed three objectives. The first was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, an objective that was based on a lie or deliberately fabricated information. The second was to hunt down Al-Qaeda embers and terrorist groups -- another lie: there was no connection between Saddam's Iraq and Al-Qaeda. The third was to establish a democracy in Iraq that would inspire and be emulated by other peoples of the Middle East. This was not so much a lie as it was rhetoric concealing the ideological designs of the neo-conservatives and of individuals of Arab origins in the American academic establishment. It was also clear from the outset that this objective, even if sincere, was unattainable. President Bush was wrong to have put his faith in the assurances of his aides that this objective would be easily accomplished. In the process, he depleted much of America's moral clout and political stock.

Neither was the Iraqi problem a candidate for a democratic solution, nor were the Arab peoples and their governments prepared to take this particular opportunity to overhaul their systems of government. Clearly, the Arabs' antipathy towards the pressures the Americans were applying far outweighed the pressures themselves, and this contributed to the Bush administration's electoral failure.

Since well before the Iraq invasion, Bush sought to obtain assurances from Iraq's Arab neighbours and some Arab governments slightly further afield that they would help ensure the security of Iraq's borders, as well as assuage sectarian tensions in Iraq. These governments did not refuse; even the Arab League declared its willingness to do what it could. The Bush administration -- or what's left of it -- cannot claim that the Arabs didn't help. They did, but they did so grudgingly. I, along with many others, heard American commentators remark that when it came to lending their support in Iraq, the Arabs were hesitant, inconsistent and negative. "Negative" is an attribute, not without considerable inspiration from Israel and the Zionist lobby in the US, that Washington has perpetually affixed to all forms of Arab political behaviour.

When the Lebanese crisis erupted with the capture of two Israeli soldiers followed by a brutal Israeli disciplinary campaign, the Bush administration imagined that the opportunity was at hand to turn the tables in Iraq and recover some of its dwindling popularity in the US. The administration placed great hopes in Arab governments for steering Arab public opinion in a direction that would further the administration's aims in Iraq and at home. Again, Washington was disappointed. Many American newspapers remarked on how the Arab governments changed course mid-stream, and on the "negative" official and popular attitudes towards America that kept Washington from reaping the fruits of an opportunity that, as Seymour Hersh revealed, Israel and the US had been planning for some time.

In addition to this so-called negativism, anti- Americanism, or hostility to American foreign policy, has not abated in the Arab-Islamic world over the past few years. But the Arabs are not alone in this. According to opinion polls in Europe and Asia, hatred for American foreign policy has reached unprecedented levels, even, surprisingly, in Britain. I, therefore, have no cause to censure the Arabs for expressing such sympathies, especially after having watched the congressional electoral campaigns and noted the "hate campaign" the Democrats themselves mounted against Bush and his cabinet. However, during the campaigns, the American media gave considerable play to Arab anti-American feelings with the aim of furnishing additional evidence that the Bush administration had failed to develop a feasible policy towards the Middle East. If Zionist pressure groups were instrumental in this, so too were they in a tangential campaign focussing on Bush's energy policies and, specifically, his inability to compel Arab oil producing nations to lower the price of oil. In this regard, the Arabs were not only branded "negative" again, they were also accused of ingratitude to the US for the endless sacrifices it made in order to protect the security of Arab states.

The Arabs can shout themselves blue in the face refuting their "negativism" and denying that it was a major cause of the failure of US policies in the Middle East and, hence, of the failure of the Republican Party in the recent elections. However, they won't find much sympathy in the US. After all, there is an element of truth in the allegation. It is well known that many Arab people suffer from the negativism of their government towards domestic, regional and religious issues that are crucial to the welfare of their peoples. That said, Arab negativism may have contributed to the Bush debacle, but it wasn't the sole cause or even a direct cause. With time it will become clear that the largest measure of responsibility falls on the neo- conservatives themselves. These are the people that pinpointed the Middle East as the linchpin for their imperialist designs, and these are the people who guided every step Bush took towards the declaration of war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq. More crucially, these are the people who set American interests and political behaviour in their current ideological mould, which is the major and most direct cause of the anti-Bush vote in the congressional elections.

In view of all this, it seems reasonable to expect a period in which the influence of the neo- conservatives on US foreign policy fades and the US strives to exercise a modicum of realism in its handling of the Middle East. This will first entail coming to terms frankly and practically with the equations of the Middle East conflict and, particularly, the Palestinian cause. Second, it involves entering into negotiations with Iran, Syria and the resistance movements in the Arab and Islamic world. Third, the US must separate religion from politics in the conduct of international relations and in the treatment of Muslim minorities in the West. Finally, they must expose the myth of "the clash of civilisations" and work to raise public awareness in the West of this fallacy. In addition, Washington must place some restraints on the Zionist lobbies and their disproportionate influence upon the centres of power in the White House and Congress. As the recent elections have confirmed, these pressure groups have swayed American policy in directions that conflict with American interests and principles. They were a major force behind the decision to invade Iraq, they have fuelled anti-Arab and anti- Muslim hatred in the US to a degree that threatens the lives and well-being of American Muslims, and more recently, they have begun to push for an invasion of Iran. In respect of the latter point, the remarks of former Israeli ambassador to Washington, Itamar Rabinovich, concerning the possibility of US negotiations with Iran are telling: "Can we [Israel] rely on the US alone... and let the US do what it wants [with Iran]? No, by no means." Evidently, this remark was a response to a statement issued by Philip Zelikow, advisor to Condoleezza Rice to the effect that if the US is to create an Arab alliance against Iran, it would have to pressure Israel into making concessions to the Palestinians.

On the other hand, there is nothing to confirm that the recent congressional election results will compel Bush towards a more realistic foreign policy approach. If anything, the situation is more ambiguous. Some point to the setting sun of the neo-conservatives, as evidenced by Bush's dismissal of key neo-con White House staff, and by Defense Secretary Bob Gates's indication that he will do the same in the Pentagon. Others, however, argue that the neo-conservatives have gained considerable ground over recent years and that their influence now extends throughout many sectors of society, even within the Democratic Party. Whatever shift we see in the White House, they say, is purely cosmetic and solely intended to dissociate itself from the failures at home and abroad. It has been suggested that some in the White House had anticipated disaster and abandoned ship before it sunk. A comment issued by former Bush adviser Richard Perle several weeks ago supports this contention. The "king of the neo-cons" said, "if we had known that the Bush administration would act so blunderingly and incompetently we wouldn't have urged him to invade Iraq." Further confirmation that the shift in the attitudes of the White House is superficial and transient is to be found in the knowledge that the elections brought many hawks into both Houses of Congress and that Vice-President Dick Cheney remains in place as the person best placed to recover from administration's electoral defeat, recharge the neo-conservatives resolve and shore up their bases of support in Congress and outside.

I have no doubt that Arab governments have a greater chance than ever before to influence policies on the Middle East, for the simple reason that in Iraq and elsewhere the US desperately needs the Arabs. But, regardless of what the US wants, I believe that the Arabs should summon the will to act in their own interests, quickly and on several fronts. That is of course, if the portrait Richard Hass painted of the future is accurate. In his recent interview with Der Spiegel, the president of the Council of Foreign Relations suggests that the future is grim:

"No viable peace process between Israel and the Palestinians is likely for the foreseeable future. Militias will emerge throughout the region, terrorism will grow in sophistication, tensions between Sunni and Shia will increase, causing problems in countries with divided societies, such as Bahrain, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Islam will fill the political and intellectual vacuum. Iraq at best will remain messy for years to come, with a weak central government, a divided society and sectarian violence. At worst, it will become a failed state racked by all-out civil war that will draw in its neighbours."

The picture grows gloomier still if we think of everything that Israel might get up to in such a dismal Middle East.

* The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.


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