Waiting for It

January 21, 2007

The prospect of the seemingly inevitable war against Iran is no less than terrifying. That the war has already started, with Special Forces and CIA operations on-going in that country, twenty-plus thousand more troops on the way to Iraq, the kidnapping of Iranian envoys in Iraq, our funding of opposition groups, and the arrival of second carrier group, is clear. We all know this will be disastrous, but Congress is doomed to offer only rhetorical resistance. The Doubleduh-Cheney Gang will have its way. It listens to nobody and really doesn't care about opposition. It marches to a drum that shuts out any other sound.

Retired USAF Colonel Sam Gardiner in CounterPunch, "The Pieces Are Being Put in Place":

The pieces are moving. They’ll be in place by the end of
February. The United States will be able to escalate military operations against Iran.

The second carrier strike group leaves the U.S. west coast on January 16. It will be joined by naval mine clearing assets from both the United States and the UK. Patriot missile defense systems have also been ordered to deploy to the Gulf.

Maybe as a guard against North Korea seeing operations focused on Iran as a chance to be aggressive, a squadron of F-117 stealth fighters has just been deployed to Korea.

This has to be called escalation. We have to remind ourselves, just as Iran is supporting groups inside Iraq, the United States is supporting groups inside Iran. Just as Iran has special operations troops operating inside Iraq, we’ve read the United States has special operations troops operating inside Iran.

Just as Iran is supporting Hamas, two weeks ago we found out the United States is supporting arms for Abbas. Just as Iran and Syria are supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon we’re now learning the White House has approved a finding to allow the CIA to support opposition groups inside Lebanon. Just as Iran is supporting Syria, we’ve learned recently that the United States is going to fund Syrian opposition groups . . .

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies published this detailed document, "A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences", two and a half years ago:

At a time when Iraq and the war on terrorism tend to dominate the debate on international affairs, the possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has not been a major topic of discussion in the United States. There are reports, however, that the Bush administration has seriously considered this option but opted to put it on the back burner for the time being.[1] Further, on May 6, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 398 in a 376-3 vote, calling on the U.S. government "to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."[2] If a similar resolution passes the Senate, it will give President Bush or any future administration the ability to launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities whenever this is deemed necessary.

In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit further[3]; it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor.[4] Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception.[5] On November 11, 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran."[6] Less than two weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession"[7] and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites.[8] This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel or the United States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action . . .

Contrary to popular belief, it appears that Israel's attack on Osirak in June of 1981 did nothing to hinder Iraq's nuclear aspirations. Although it temporarily set back its capabilities, it served rather to reinforce and increase Saddam's desire for a nuclear arsenal. In fact, Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri claims that Israel's preemptive strike against the French-built Tamuz Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was not really suitable for plutonium production anyway, had the exact opposite effect of the one intended: it sent Saddam Hussein's A-bomb program into overdrive and convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full fledged nuclear weapons program immediately afterwards.[28]

Khidir Hamza, another Iraqi nuclear scientist and one of the leading proponents of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, gave a near identical assessment. He told Mike Begala on CNN's Crossfire on February 7, 2003:

Israel -- actually, what Israel [did] is that it got out the immediate danger out of the way. But it created a much larger danger in the longer range. What happened is that Saddam ordered us - we were 400... scientists and technologists running the program. And when they bombed that reactor out, we had also invested $400 million. And the French reactor and the associated plans were from Italy. When they bombed it out we became 7,000 with a $10 billion investment for a secret, much larger underground program to make bomb material by enriching uranium. We dropped the reactor out totally, which was the plutonium for making nuclear weapons, and went directly into enriching uranium.... They [Israel] estimated we'd make 7kg of plutonium a year, which is enough for one bomb. And they get scared and bombed it out. Actually it was much less than this, and it would have taken a much longer time. But the program we built later in secret would make six bombs a year.[29]

Furthermore, in his book Saddam's Bombmaker, Dr. Hamza states that following the destruction of Osirak in June 1981, Saddam Hussein decided not to repeat the mistake of concentrating all of Iraq's nuclear assets in a single declared location. With the help of the Soviets, the Iraqis embarked on a covert nuclear program that simultaneously extended and hid Iraq's uranium enrichment facilities. Many of these facilities were disguised as warehouses or schools; others were hidden behind farmhouses - all of which was aimed at confusing the IAEA inspectors and preventing them from discovering Iraq's true nuclear potential.

It was Saddam's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, compounded by the difficulty of acquiring sufficient fissile material that doomed Iraq's nuclear prospects. Prior to the invasion, Iraq's nuclear program was moving full speed ahead to produce enough fissile material for nuclear bomb assembly, assuming it could obtain enough uranium. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait changed everything, resulting in UN Security Council Resolution 687, which banned Iraqi possession of any WMD programs.[30] Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, in addition to more than a decade of UN sanctions and inspections, virtually stripped Iraq off its nuclear technology gains and bomb-making ability . . .

With regard to Iran, there is no reason to believe that an attack on the facilities in Bushehr, Arak, or Natanz would have any different consequence than the Osirak example. Such an attack would likely embolden and enhance Iran's nuclear prospects in the long term. In the absence of an Iranian nuclear weapon program, which IAEA inspectors have yet to find, a preemptive attack by the United States or Israel would provide Iran with the impetus and justification to pursue a full blown covert nuclear deterrent program, without the inconvenience of IAEA inspections. Such an attack would likely be seen as an act of aggression not only by Iran but most of the international community, and only serve to weaken any diplomatic coalition currently available against Iran.

The most troubling aspect of such a scenario is that, unlike Iraq in 1981, Iran is not dependent on foreign imports for nuclear technology and already has available the raw materials, and most of the designs and techniques, required to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Iran has the necessary know-how and has already produced every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle.[31] Furthermore, Iran has uranium mines in Yazd and is in the process of constructing milling plants to manufacture yellow cake uranium and conversion plants that convert it to UF6 gas.[32] Iran has also begun manufacturing its own gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Even if Natanz, Arak, and Bushehr were destroyed in a preemptive strike, Iran probably has duplicate equipment that can be activated and has the know-how to produce more, to pursue a more vigorous and unabated nuclear weapons program in the long term . . .

In the event of an unprovoked preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities, Iran could justifiably argue that it requires nuclear weapons to guard against aggression and protect its sovereignty, effectively announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT and altering the current international dynamic. Especially given the recent lack of substantiation in the Iraqi WMD case, such a strike would undoubtedly result in U.S. or Israeli diplomatic isolation . . .

The practical diplomatic consequences of a preemptive attack in Iran are worth considering. In the aftermath of such a strike, it is highly unlikely that the United States would be able to convince members of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran. Without international sanctions, Iran will be able to allocate greater financial and human resources to its nuclear program. If the Iraqi Osirak example is any indication, the size of Iran's nuclear program would probably increase dramatically, as the Iranian government touts an expanded nuclear program as the key to deterring Iran's enemies . . .

As the target of an unprovoked attack, Iran gains by pointing to justifications for escaping the constraints of the NPT, therefore becoming a much greater proliferation threat. Unrestrained, the Iranians will have the means and technology to eventually manufacture gas centrifuges and mine, mill, convert, and enrich uranium. Even under IAEA intrusive inspections, Iran has assembled more than 920 gas centrifuges, 120 of which were assembled in just two and a half months, between November 2003 and mid-January 2004.[33] To enrich enough HEU to make one nuclear bomb requires running 750 gas centrifuges for one year.[34] If Iran seceded from the NPT, and increased the size of its nuclear program, it would be able to manufacture and assemble many more gas centrifuges, and therefore rapidly enrich uranium. Once sufficient fissile material is obtained, designing a basic nuclear warhead can be easily accomplished. In the absence of intrusive inspections or threat of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, the only way to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability would be to occupy Iran, a very unlikely occurrence given the serious challenges already faced by the United States in a smaller, weaker Iraq . . .

Attacking Iranian nuclear facilities also has the potential of igniting a diplomatic crisis between the United States and Russia. The Russian Federation is not only Iran's foremost supplier of nuclear technology and training, it is reported that hundreds of Russian scientists and technicians currently work in Bushehr. A preemptive attack on Bushehr may kill a large number of Iranian and Russian personnel; the ensuing diplomatic crisis could seriously affect not only Russian-U.S. trade but also cooperation on international matters, including the war on terrorism . . .

An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities that are viewed by most Iranians as a symbol of national pride and technological progress would provide the Iranian mullahs the necessary justification to intensify their crackdown on dissidents and moderates, whom the hawks are likely to brand as agents of foreign powers. It is equally plausible that, fearing such a backlash, domestic opposition forces in Iran would band together with Iran's new hawkish majority in parliament and abandon their calls and protests for reform . . .

Open source information suggests that currently Iran possesses more than 500 Shehab ballistic missiles. Most of these missiles are Shehab-1 and -2, with a 300- to 500-kilometer (km) range and a 700- to 985-kilogram (kg) payload.[37] With these missiles, Iran is capable of reaching U.S. bases in Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq. Iran is also believed to possess 25 to100 Shehab-3 ballistic missiles, displayed in a military parade marking the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq war on September 22, 2003.[38] The Shehab-3 has a 1,300km range, a 700kg payload, and is capable of reaching Israeli cities and bases (See: Chart 1). Iran could launch dozens of these ballistic missiles in the direction of Israel; and U.S. targets in the region, over a long period, depending on the size of the Iranian arsenal, the desired severity of the counterattack, and the ability of U.S. forces to find and destroy their missile launchers.

On the one hand, the destructive potential of these ballistic missile systems should not be underestimated. Although these Scud variants are relatively inaccurate - they are certainly incapable of the pinpoint accuracy associated with U.S. cruise missiles and guided munitions - they do have much greater accuracy and higher payloads than the Iraqi al-Husseins that turned out a mediocre CEP (circular error probability) of 1 to 3km in 1991.[39] Multiple missiles attacks on U.S. or Israeli targets carrying large warheads can potentially be very deadly, as demonstrated by an Iraqi Scud attack on barracks in Saudi Arabia in early 1991. It turned out to be the deadliest such incident of the entire war for U.S. troops, killing 28 and injuring 98.[40] . . .

The piece is excellent and goes on to consider the widespread potential consequences involving the whole of the Middle East. To imagine that we would escape increased attacks within our own borders is just ignorance.

Iran is no patsy. Russia and other European nations have a geopolitical stake there. Shi'ites all over the place will attack "American interests". We will not have stabilized Iraq enough to use it as a secure military base. We will take a big hurt.

About a year ago, GlobalSecurity.org reported:

When the media considers how the Iranians could respond, it generally only speculates on the Iranians responding passively and ceasing oil production. According to CNN, the result would be an immediate 5 percent drop in the global supply, which could cause prices to rise in excess of $60 a barrel, creating a minor pain for Americans at the gas pump. This scenario is dangerously optimistic. The hardliners controlling the Iranian government will not react timidly. While the Iranian military lacks the sheer power of the American armed forces, it does not need to match strength for strength.

After American or Israeli forces attack, the Iranians will likely retaliate using ballistic missiles, attacking Israeli cities and American bases around the Persian Gulf. Attacks against Israel should prove ineffective. Iran has a small inventory of missiles that have the necessary 1,300 km range to strike targets within Israel, according to Globalsecurity.org, and since the First Gulf War, Israel has developed an effective anti-ballistic-missile program. The Iranians do have a sizeable arsenal of shorter-range missiles that could be used to strike American targets in Iraq.

Although Patriot Missile batteries proved effective against Iraqi missiles in the second Gulf War, it may be possible to overwhelm individual batteries. Only 54 such batteries were deployed during the second Gulf War, defending staging areas in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There are likely fewer systems in theater at the moment, and American bases are dispersed throughout Iraq, making them harder to protect. By firing enough missiles into the Green Zone in Baghdad, the Iranians could decapitate the Iraqi government and kill a large number of American military leaders.

They could also attempt to attack the American 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The Iranians possess a significant stockpile of anti-ship missiles, consisting of hundreds of older French Exocets, Chinese C-802s, locally developed variants of the C-802 and a small number of highly lethal Russian missiles, according to Globalsecurity.org.

The Russian weapons are of particular concern because the SS-N-22 Moskit and SS-NX-26 Yakhont are designed to defeat the defenses of a carrier battle group. Traveling at more than two times the speed of sound, any vessel targeted by this warhead would optimally have 25 to 30 seconds between detection and impact, giving American warships no time to react defensively. The danger these missiles present becomes clear when the dimensions of the Persian Gulf are considered; at its widest, it is 338 km and narrows to a scant 48 km at the Strait of Hormuz, the only exit from the Persian Gulf. These missiles have a range of 120 km and 300 km respectively, making the Persian Gulf a shooting gallery. At best, the Iranians may manage to sink a few destroyers and frigates. At worst, they could destroy an aircraft carrier, killing thousands of Americans. Those who would dismiss this scenario should recall what the Argentineans managed to do in the Falklands War with only six Exocets.

The Iranians could also use their anti-ship missiles to cut off tanker traffic passing through the Strait of Hormuz. This would deny the world oil production from Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and part of Saudi Arabia, driving prices far higher than normally postulated and causing severe harm to the global economy.

Their final and most dramatic option would be to launch a ground war against American forces in Iraq. American forces are not prepared for a ground war. They are scattered across the country, conducting peacekeeping operations in what could become hostile territory.

The reason Iraq has not yet turned into Vietnam is because the Shiite clerics who hold sway over the majority of the population have largely refrained from hostility against American forces. Aside from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s aborted insurgency, American forces have spent most of their time fighting Sunni insurgents.

Most of the more powerful clerics have strong connections to Iran. Iran has taken care to support these clerics by providing funds, training and weapons for their militias. In the event of an attack on Iran, various militias could rise against American garrisons. One cleric, Al-Sadr, has already pledged to do so. Alone, they would not be able to defeat American forces in Iraq, but they could lock American forces in place . . .

We cannot in America fathom what a disaster this will be. Wait for it.

Categories: Iran, war, consequences