Fallout of Lebanese war roils Israel

Sunday, February 04, 2007
VIEW

Ahmad Faruqui

Halutz’s departure, much as it reflects on the strategic myopia of his generalship, is a tribute to Israel’s polity. After his botched war effort, he ultimately took responsibility for his actions and stepped down from office, since he regarded it as a privilege bestowed upon him by the people and not his birthright

In the wake of the worst military blunder in Israel’s history since the Yom Kippur War, its Chief of General Staff, Lt-Gen Dan Halutz, has resigned. Gen. Halutz, a 40-year old veteran of the Israeli Air Force, had served in his post for only 20 months. Defence Minister Perez may follow suit, further weakening Prime Minister Olmert. And it does not help matters that President Katsav, for unrelated reasons, has gone on a leave of absence.

Halutz’s Lebanese campaign failed to achieve any of its stated objectives. These included the recovery of two Israeli soldiers, whose abduction last July by Hezbollah precipitated the conflict, and protecting Israel’s northern towns and settlements from Hezbollah rocket attacks. To this day, the soldiers remain in Hezbollah hands and the only hope for their recovery lies in a diplomatic solution. In addition, several military commentators have stated that northern Israel remains within the reach of Hezbollah rockets.

On a strategic level, Israel’s losses were even greater. The war plucked Syed Hassan Nasrullah, the head of Hezbollah, from the depths of obscurity and turned him into a household name. On the Arab street, posters carrying his smiling face emerged as a welcome alternative to the grim visage of effete and feckless monarchs, dictators and tyrants.

Israel also lost the war for global public opinion, as images of buildings being toppled by Israeli bombs continued to fill the TV screens. The only gain to Israel was that it gained new knowledge about Hezbollah’s military capabilities, strategy and tactics.

Senior Israeli generals welcomed Halutz’s resignation. Halutz is likely to be replaced by a retired army officer, Gabi Ashkenazi, 53, who fought in the 1973 Yom Kippur war and took part in the 1976 Entebbe raid. Maj-Gen Ashkenazi resigned from the army in 2005 when he was passed over for the military chief’s job. Now, it seems that that the political elite is returning to the well-established formula of relying on army officers to lead the military.

Soul searching about what went wrong in Lebanon has begun within the Israeli military establishment. Maj-Gen (reserves) Emmanual Sakal feels it was a mistake to appoint an air force commander as head of the General Staff. Sakal, formerly the head of Israel’s ground forces, told Israel Radio that it had been a mistake to think that a pilot, “no matter how talented,” could deal effectively with the problems faced by ground forces in war.

He and others fault Halutz for his excessive reliance on the Air Force to stop the Katyusha rocket fire and for lack of consistency in his orders. Halutz believed that combat planes and helicopters using guided weapons would annihilate the Hezbollah guerillas. Like many other air force commanders, he believed that modern wars could be won by air dominance on the battlefield. Air power is a necessary but not sufficient condition for winning a conventional ground war. In a guerilla war, it may be counter-productive since large-scale civilian casualties will strengthen the enemy.

The campaign in Lebanon confirmed this theory. Halutz began the war with a brilliant air strike but failed to exploit the opportunities it created on the ground. Indeed, it may have been impossible to win the war even if there had been sufficient ‘boots on the ground’.

Readers seeking amplification of this point can consult the remarkable new book by British General Sir Rupert Smith. He argues that today’s military institutions, which are focused on waging “industrial warfare”, need to retool their mindset for waging “war among the peoples”. The new frontier is not a line in the sand but a line in the mind.

After the Lebanese war, bereaved parents and politicians, along with retired and serving military officers, called on Halutz to resign. When GOC Northern Command, Udi Adam, and Galilee Division Commander, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, submitted their resignations, the clock started to tick for Halutz. He was a proud man who had boasted that dropping one-ton bombs on Palestinians in Gaza had not bothered him in the least. To quote the British Daily Telegraph, he fell on his Uzi.

Given his long tenure in the Israeli military, it is inconceivable that Halutz would not have been aware of what happened to the military chief in Pakistan after his incursion into Kargil boomeranged in 1999. Halutz must have wished that after leading his forces on a fool’s errand, and after causing significant harm to his country’s global standing, in addition to causing the deaths of thousands on both sides and impairing the national security of his country, he too would have been able to use the device of a coup to hide his sins.

He would have relished the prospect that awaited Gen Musharraf after the withdrawal from Kargil. When the fiasco was plain for all to see, Gen Musharraf did not feel the weight of public opinion on his shoulders. Instead, he arrogated more power to himself by firing justices of the Supreme Court that did not support the coup, getting himself elected president by a misbegotten referendum, and amending the constitution to give himself unrivalled, absolute and indefinite power. By the stroke of a pen, a man who had caused incalculable harm to the country became the interpreter and guardian of the national interest.

Seven years later, he would write in glowing terms about Kargil, calling it one of the best campaigns in Pakistani history. By so doing, not only did he falsify facts. He also signaled that he felt no remorse. Musharraf also closed off the door for an honest inquiry, ensuring that his successors will fail to imbibe the true lessons of history and stumble once again into Kargilian follies.

However much one might disagree with Israel’s foreign policies, and however much one might deplore its treatment of the Palestinians, one has to admire the strength of its political institutions. Halutz’s departure, much as it reflects on the strategic myopia of his generalship, is a tribute to Israel’s polity. After his botched war effort, he ultimately took responsibility for his actions and stepped down from office, since he regarded it as a privilege bestowed upon him by the people and not his birthright.

In the mean time, the people of Pakistan await the dawn of the day when their military chief will take responsibility for his actions. Instead, he plans to get re-elected by the existing assemblies, hardly the actions of a man who believes he is more popular than all other politicians. He is a man who uses his uniform to hide from the electorate.

The writer, an economist based in San Francisco, has authored “Rethinking the national security of Pakistan,” Ashgate Publishing, 2003