Commentary
Mahmoud LabadiMarch 21, 2007
-- The Palestinians are faced with the infamous request of recognizing Israel. A request carrying various dimensions ranging from the psychological to the highly political.
Such a recognition request is not only advanced by the Israelis, but by Western countries and the Quartet as well. However, the more Palestinians are reluctant to accede, the more Israel and its proponents insist on it. This projected demand and the halt of violence have become an international prerequisite to the resumption of the peace negotiations.
The Palestinian national psyche refuses such an unconditional recognition, given that it is considered a capitulation, and a priceless concession, without any reward. In this respect, Palestinians don't admit to the supremacy of their powerful neighbor, since they have been struggling for their own recognition, which they have been denied, for decades. Unlike states, peoples usually never capitulate to victors and there is always a vanguard to wage guerrilla warfare, thereby defying the aggressor.
Palestinians believe that they are the ones who need to be recognized by Israel and the international community, and to see their rights protected. They don't accept the irrational logic of the victor and his Western allies, even though they know their side is the weaker, and that the balance of power goes against them.
Paradoxically, with all the restrictions placed, Israel and the international community are tying the hands of the Palestinians without leaving them any breathing space. They keep hammering away at Palestinians with this dubious demand of "recognition" in an attempt to break their will.
In this regard, an important question has to be addressed to the Western political mind about the moral justification of this demand and its political dimension.
Are Palestinians required to recognize the Jewish state as an absolute entity or within certain borders, and, if the latter, which borders? The pre-1967 war boundaries or the post-1967 war boundaries? Or, are Palestinians required to recognize the ugly separation wall as the final frontier?
Are Palestinians required to recognize the solidification of Jewish nationalism or Zionism, on Palestinian land? Or, is it recognition of Israel's regional supremacy, which is in question?
What about Zionist recognition for Palestinian nationalism or patriotism?
The struggle for recognition on both sides and the alignment of pros and cons provides us with insight into the nature of international politics. Although the Palestinian Liberation Organization has already used this precious bargaining card during the Oslo agreements, Israel is never tired of forever repeating the same demand. The demand itself, thus, is used as a delaying tactic to forestall any serious peaceful settlement. Any newly-formed Palestinian government has to declare its public recognition to the state of Israel, be it Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or anyone else.
In analyzing the recognition process, Francis Fukuyama wrote the following in the preface of his famous 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man:
"The desire for recognition that led to the original bloody battles for prestige between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism and world empire. The relationship of lordship and bondage, on a domestic level, is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations, as a whole, seek recognition, and enter into bloody battles for supremacy." As an American scholar, Fukuyama is not, here, referring to Israel's wars to be recognized by Palestinians and the other Middle Eastern Arab states - he is actually referencing various nationalism-fueled European wars that occurred over the last 200 years - yet his description is fully compatible with the situation in the region.
In fact, the state of Israel, through the five or six wars it has waged against its Arab or Palestinian neighbors, has become the super power in the region, imposing itself as supreme master. Israeli nationalism or Zionism has been a vehicle for the struggle for recognition over the past century, as well as the source of intense conflicts with the emerging Arab and Palestinian nationalisms.
On the other hand, Arab nationalism started its campaign to be recognized by Western colonialist powers after World War I under the slogan of freedom and independence. While Palestinians launched their recognition struggle against British colonialism and the emerging Jewish nationalism, proponents of both Palestinian and Jewish nationalism clashed with each other, simultaneously fighting their wars against the British mandate. However, the balance of power favored Zionist ambitions, while Palestinians are still fighting for their nationalism and statehood to be recognized.
But if the struggle is driven by the desire for recognition, then it is advisable for nationalist proponents of both camps to reciprocally recognize one another's legitimacy. Consequently, the relationship of "lordship and bondage" would be abolished, making the Palestinian underdogs their own masters, while having a similar effect on the relationship between two sovereign, and mutually recognized, states.
Through his piercing historical analysis, Fukuyama believes the solution to such recognition wars lies in liberal democracies replacing the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others, by a rational desire to be seen as an equal. "A world made up of liberal democracies, should have much less incentive for a war," he writes.
Indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence from the past 200 years that - bar the rare exception - liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another, even if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that are not democracies, and that adhere to intrinsically different values. The demand for national recognition in Western Europe has, thus, been relinquished in favor of a universal recognition in a larger union of different European nations.
But here in the Middle East, the peoples of the region are infected by the disease of nationalism, and are still far from establishing liberal democracies based on tolerance and respect for other cultures, religions, and rights. Which is to say: we are still governed by the curse of the last centuries, with proponents of Arab, Palestinian, and Jewish nationalism condemned to fighting each other, spilling ever greater quantities of innocent blood.
Mahmoud Labadi served as the spokesperson of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon until 1983. He was the director-general of the Palestinian Legislative Council until his retirement in 2005. Acknowledgement to the Arab Media Internet Network (AMIN).
Read the related commentary titled: "Commentary: Seizing on the Saudi initiative," by Alon Ben-Meir.
As well as the commentary titled: "Commentary: Israel will either talk or attack," by Yossi Alpher.
And the commentary titled: "Commentary: Optimism and despair," by Ghassan Khatib.
Such a recognition request is not only advanced by the Israelis, but by Western countries and the Quartet as well. However, the more Palestinians are reluctant to accede, the more Israel and its proponents insist on it. This projected demand and the halt of violence have become an international prerequisite to the resumption of the peace negotiations.
The Palestinian national psyche refuses such an unconditional recognition, given that it is considered a capitulation, and a priceless concession, without any reward. In this respect, Palestinians don't admit to the supremacy of their powerful neighbor, since they have been struggling for their own recognition, which they have been denied, for decades. Unlike states, peoples usually never capitulate to victors and there is always a vanguard to wage guerrilla warfare, thereby defying the aggressor.
Palestinians believe that they are the ones who need to be recognized by Israel and the international community, and to see their rights protected. They don't accept the irrational logic of the victor and his Western allies, even though they know their side is the weaker, and that the balance of power goes against them.
Paradoxically, with all the restrictions placed, Israel and the international community are tying the hands of the Palestinians without leaving them any breathing space. They keep hammering away at Palestinians with this dubious demand of "recognition" in an attempt to break their will.
In this regard, an important question has to be addressed to the Western political mind about the moral justification of this demand and its political dimension.
Are Palestinians required to recognize the Jewish state as an absolute entity or within certain borders, and, if the latter, which borders? The pre-1967 war boundaries or the post-1967 war boundaries? Or, are Palestinians required to recognize the ugly separation wall as the final frontier?
Are Palestinians required to recognize the solidification of Jewish nationalism or Zionism, on Palestinian land? Or, is it recognition of Israel's regional supremacy, which is in question?
What about Zionist recognition for Palestinian nationalism or patriotism?
The struggle for recognition on both sides and the alignment of pros and cons provides us with insight into the nature of international politics. Although the Palestinian Liberation Organization has already used this precious bargaining card during the Oslo agreements, Israel is never tired of forever repeating the same demand. The demand itself, thus, is used as a delaying tactic to forestall any serious peaceful settlement. Any newly-formed Palestinian government has to declare its public recognition to the state of Israel, be it Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or anyone else.
In analyzing the recognition process, Francis Fukuyama wrote the following in the preface of his famous 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man:
"The desire for recognition that led to the original bloody battles for prestige between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism and world empire. The relationship of lordship and bondage, on a domestic level, is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations, as a whole, seek recognition, and enter into bloody battles for supremacy." As an American scholar, Fukuyama is not, here, referring to Israel's wars to be recognized by Palestinians and the other Middle Eastern Arab states - he is actually referencing various nationalism-fueled European wars that occurred over the last 200 years - yet his description is fully compatible with the situation in the region.
In fact, the state of Israel, through the five or six wars it has waged against its Arab or Palestinian neighbors, has become the super power in the region, imposing itself as supreme master. Israeli nationalism or Zionism has been a vehicle for the struggle for recognition over the past century, as well as the source of intense conflicts with the emerging Arab and Palestinian nationalisms.
On the other hand, Arab nationalism started its campaign to be recognized by Western colonialist powers after World War I under the slogan of freedom and independence. While Palestinians launched their recognition struggle against British colonialism and the emerging Jewish nationalism, proponents of both Palestinian and Jewish nationalism clashed with each other, simultaneously fighting their wars against the British mandate. However, the balance of power favored Zionist ambitions, while Palestinians are still fighting for their nationalism and statehood to be recognized.
But if the struggle is driven by the desire for recognition, then it is advisable for nationalist proponents of both camps to reciprocally recognize one another's legitimacy. Consequently, the relationship of "lordship and bondage" would be abolished, making the Palestinian underdogs their own masters, while having a similar effect on the relationship between two sovereign, and mutually recognized, states.
Through his piercing historical analysis, Fukuyama believes the solution to such recognition wars lies in liberal democracies replacing the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others, by a rational desire to be seen as an equal. "A world made up of liberal democracies, should have much less incentive for a war," he writes.
Indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence from the past 200 years that - bar the rare exception - liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another, even if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that are not democracies, and that adhere to intrinsically different values. The demand for national recognition in Western Europe has, thus, been relinquished in favor of a universal recognition in a larger union of different European nations.
But here in the Middle East, the peoples of the region are infected by the disease of nationalism, and are still far from establishing liberal democracies based on tolerance and respect for other cultures, religions, and rights. Which is to say: we are still governed by the curse of the last centuries, with proponents of Arab, Palestinian, and Jewish nationalism condemned to fighting each other, spilling ever greater quantities of innocent blood.
Mahmoud Labadi served as the spokesperson of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon until 1983. He was the director-general of the Palestinian Legislative Council until his retirement in 2005. Acknowledgement to the Arab Media Internet Network (AMIN).
Read the related commentary titled: "Commentary: Seizing on the Saudi initiative," by Alon Ben-Meir.
As well as the commentary titled: "Commentary: Israel will either talk or attack," by Yossi Alpher.
And the commentary titled: "Commentary: Optimism and despair," by Ghassan Khatib.
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