The Abandonment

How the Bush Administration Left Israelis and Palestinians to Their Fate

By Aaron David Miller
Sunday, April 29, 2007; B01

This is the tragedy of America's situation now in the Promised Land: Never has the Arab-Israeli issue been more critical to our national interests and to our security, yet rarely have we been so uniquely ill-positioned to manage it -- let alone resolve it. In a post-9/11 era, the cause of Palestine drives recruits to al-Qaeda and helps generate lethal levels of anti-Americanism. But for almost seven years, the Bush administration has hung a "Closed for the Season" sign on serious Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's recent Middle East mission has shown that the administration is now finally open for Arab-Israeli business. But the Rice initiative is almost certainly way too little, way too late.

Watching Rice these days, I have to believe that she knows this too, despite her public optimism. Having worked for her six predecessors on Arab-Israeli negotiations, I think it's pretty clear that the odds against a dramatic breakthrough are long, the time for the Bush administration is short, and the gaps between Israelis and Palestinians are galactic. So Rice's belated efforts face terribly long odds -- both because the region has changed too much and because the United States has sat on the sidelines for too long.

As one of the planners of the Camp David summit in July 2000, I'm painfully aware that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's unwillingness to negotiate, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's illusions about ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the cheap and President Bill Clinton's well-intentioned but weak summit management doomed the last, best chance for a breakthrough. But if you think diplomacy doesn't work, try abandonment. Years of off-again, on-again Israeli-Palestinian confrontation and neglect from the Bush administration have reduced the chances of ending the conflict from slim to none.

Part of the problem is that the "software" of Israeli-Palestinian relations has changed: The confidence, trust and problem-solving spirit of the 1990s Oslo peace process have been replaced by unilateralism, fear, anger and a loss of faith in the power of negotiations to alter cruel realities on the ground. But the hardware of the conflict has also changed during the Bush hiatus. Palestinian suicide terrorism, rockets and kidnappings have combined with Israeli closures, targeted killings and settlement growth to make cooperation excruciatingly difficult. The emblem of this deterioration is Hamas, which has had the upper hand in Palestinian politics since winning elections in January 2006. The radical Islamic movement's entry into Palestinian government -- without abandoning terrorism -- has produced a semblance of unity in Palestinian politics, but it has also guaranteed continued strife with Israel. Palestinians are buying peace at home at the price of conflict next door.

To those intrepid souls who argue that desperation and crisis have pushed Israelis and Palestinians closer to a deal in the seven lost years, I can say only that I hope so -- but my experience suggests otherwise. In an existential conflict driven by memory, identity, religion and national trauma, the Israeli and Palestinian capacities to absorb and inflict pain are limitless. When these two sides become fearful and angry, they don't get magnanimous, they get even. Rice has said that "the underlying circumstances" for peacemaking "are better now" than they were in 2000. That reminds me of Groucho Marx's famous line: "Who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?"

There are a few hopeful signs, particularly Saudi Arabia's new peace push and a willingness by some key pro-U.S. Arab states to be more active. But against these rays of hope looms a perfect storm of negatives that has been gathering for years. Here are the four most troubling problems:

Weak Leaders

Even if there were a deal to be cut, nobody is on the ground to cut it. The age of heroic politics in Arab-Israeli peacemaking is over, at least for now. We see plenty of smart politicians but few statesmen. The titans -- Egypt's Anwar Sadat, Jordan's King Hussein, Israel's Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Rabin -- are gone; even more flawed figures such as Arafat and Ariel Sharon are gone. And with them have gone the historic legitimacy, courage and clout for making big decisions. Instead, on the Israeli side, we've seen young, inexperienced prime ministers -- Barak, Binyamin Netanyahu and the country's flailing current leader, Ehud Olmert -- who lack authority and tend to stumble badly.

On the Arab side, the situation is even gloomier. Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, has managed to reveal almost all the tyrannical flaws of his late father but none of his savvy strengths. On the Palestinian side, Mahmoud Abbas, the head of Arafat's fading Fatah faction, is a good man who's being permanently sidelined by Hamas.

Yesterday's titans made history. Today's pols are pushed around by it. They are prisoners, not masters, of their politics and constituencies. And it's hard to see anyone better on the horizon.

Strong Spoilers

In this leadership vacuum, non-state actors have wreaked havoc. Hamas and the radical Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah are more than just the garden-variety terrorists and thugs who, in the old days, could retard but not block peacemaking efforts. The new spoilers are serious political players. Hamas can constrain and even block Abbas's peace efforts; Hezbollah showed during its summer 2006 war with Israel that it can embarrass Israel's army and bombard its north. These groups -- backed by Iran and Syria -- can create huge problems for weak leaders already unwilling to take risks.

Vast Gaps

The old conventional wisdom was that we knew what an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal would look like and just needed to somehow land it. But anyone who still believes that Israelis and Palestinians were "this close" to an agreement at Camp David has been talking to the peace process fairy too much. The hard fact is that each of the four titanic issues that sank the summit -- borders, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and security -- represent a universe of serious unfinished business. (And that's not for lack of trying during the Clinton years; when I think about our efforts to convince Barak and Arafat that the way to solve the problem of who would own Jerusalem's holiest sites was to hand sovereignty over them to God, I don't know whether to laugh or cry.) Hammering out an agreement to end the conflict was too hard in 2000, and it's almost unthinkable in 2007.

America Absent

Finally, and perhaps most important, since January 2001, we just haven't had the U.S. commitment to peacemaking that we've needed -- an America that's willing to build bridges when it can and crack heads when it must. Admittedly, the Bush administration inherited pretty much the worst imaginable Arab-Israeli hand: the balky Arafat on one side, the bulldozing Sharon on the other, and an Israeli-Palestinian war raging between them. Still, President Bush never saw the Arab-Israeli conflict as any kind of priority. Nor, in the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraq, has he ever believe that working the peace process might help him advance the Middle East issues he does care about.

Of course, Bush hasn't gotten many real opportunities. But after Arafat's death in November 2004 and Abbas's election in January 2005, he got one -- a very real chance to put the Palestinians' first post-Arafat leader to the test. But instead of stepping in with both feet, Washington watched from the sidelines with its post-9/11 contempt for serious diplomacy. Abbas faded; Hamas rose. Of course, Fatah's own corruption and dysfunction was what elected Hamas in January 2006 -- but Washington and the Israelis helped.

Now the White House wants to act. And there are compelling reasons why. Dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue won't eliminate radical Islamic terrorism, fix Iraq or turn dictatorships into democracies -- but it will help marginalize U.S. enemies, embolden U.S. friends, attract those sitting on the fence and, above all, boost U.S. credibility.

But I'm not holding my breath. And with the 2008 election cycle in full swing, few leaders in the region are expecting much from a last rush of lame-duck diplomacy, either. With little prospect of success, too many other priorities and a lingering unwillingness to get tough with Arabs or Israelis, there's not much chance for important diplomacy anymore.

If Bush still wanted to make a difference, however, he might consider not one "road map" (the term for a U.S.-backed peace plan nobody in the region believes in after years of U.S. apathy) but three. First, he should appoint a high-level, fully empowered envoy to directly work Israeli-Palestinian issues on the ground, including an end to violence and settlement activity, eased restrictions on Palestinian movement, economic revitalization of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier who has been held by Hamas since June 2006.

Second, Bush should encourage key Arab states to outline steps they'd take toward normalizing relations with Israel as the current deadlock eases, including a meeting soon between Israeli and Saudi officials. And finally, Rice should create a discreet Israeli-Palestinian back channel to probe whether any progress toward a lasting deal on the big issues would be possible if Washington finally waded back in.

In 2002, Bush laid out a vision of the only conceivable solution -- Israel and Palestine living side by side -- but did little to promote it. He now faces the very real prospect of watching the best and only answer to the conflict expire on his watch. That would be a tragedy for the United States and its friends -- and a blessing for its enemies.

Aaron.Miller@wilsoncenter.org

Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center

for Scholars, served as a Middle East adviser to six secretaries of state. His book

"The Much Too Promised Land" will be published in 2008.

Major invasion of Gaza Strip expected

Now why would Israel do that? Oh yah, to avoid the Arab Initiative and “peace process.”
---
(Gaza City) Palestine News Network

Wednesday, 25 April 2007

Sources indicated late Wednesday morning that Israeli forces are preparing to invade parts of the Gaza Strip within hours. The Palestine Observer to United Nations, Dr. Riyad Mansour, said, “The Israeli military build-up, incursions and attacks around the Gaza Strip constitute a clear threat of widespread aggression.”

However, the head of negotiations in the Palestine Liberation Organization, Dr. Sa'eb Erekat, said Wednesday afternoon that contacts had been between the Palestinian, Israeli and American administrations in order to prevent a further deterioration in the situation.

Government spokesperson Ghazi Hamad told the press yesterday that it is impossible to suggest that there is anything resembling a “cease-fire” in play. “The truce has collapsed in light of serious developments, including the intensification of Israeli military operations which have resulted in the killing of many with even more injured,” Hamad said.

Some in the Palestinian government are still calling for calm, but Israeli forces did spend the week invading and killing members of the armed resistance and teenagers. Under the current conditions it is a difficult sell to convince many of the people, including the armed resistance, to not fight back. Egyptian security called today upon the armed resistance to exercise restraint and stop launching projectiles in order to not give pretext for further invasion.

Hamad emphasized the need for “the aggressive practices of the occupation to stop.” He said, “Our people must be protected.” The Government Spokesperson indicated that as the threats of a major Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip continue, consultations among Palestinian forces and factions have been underway since Tuesday.

However as the Al Qassam Brigades Spokesperson in Gaza, Abu Obeiyda, pointed out, Israeli forces “destroyed the truce within hours of it beginning.”

Olive Branch From Hamas: Robert Novak

By Robert D. Novak

Monday, April 16, 2007; A17

On April 7, ending a seven-day visit to Israel, I finally got an interview I had sought for a year. I sat down in a Palestinian Authority office in Ramallah with a leader of Hamas, the extremist organization that won last year's elections. This leader pushed a two-state Israeli-Palestinian solution and deplored suicide bombers. But officials in Washington seem not to want to hear Hamas calling for peace.

No fringe character, this was Naser al-Shaer: education minister and deputy prime minister in the new coalition government. Shaer signaled that the regime recognizes Israel's right to exist and forgoes violence -- conditions essential for talks about a viable Palestinian state adjoining Israel -- even if Hamas does not. "We hope that it is going to be a matter of time," Shaer told me. "But there is a big chance now."

When I returned to Washington last week, I sought the reaction of Bush administration officials (who refuse to have any contact with Hamas). I asked to talk to Elliott Abrams, the deputy national security adviser who is most influential in policy on Israel. Abrams was once a fellow Cold Warrior and friend whom I have defended, but an aide let me know on Thursday that Abrams would not talk to me about Hamas. A senior State Department official also showed no interest in what Shaer said.

U.S. policy is not just adherence to the economic boycott that has devastated the Palestinian Authority since Hamas won elections in January 2006. U.S. government officials and contract workers in the Israeli-occupied territories must leave when someone from Hamas enters a room. Because the State Department lists Hamas as a terrorist organization, Americans not employed by the government fear that contacting a Hamas member of the Palestinian government would violate the USA Patriot Act.

Accordingly, a year ago, sources who put me in touch with other Palestinians refused to help with Hamas. The best contact I could make then was a brief telephone conversation with a Hamas underling.

I was back in Jerusalem on April 3, two weeks after Hamas brought the more moderate opposition Fatah party into the new national unity government. The Los Angeles Times had just run a remarkable op-ed by the new government's finance minister, Salam Fayyad, a political independent who lived in Washington for 20 years, served as a World Bank official and is well respected in the West. Fayyad wrote that the Palestine Liberation Organization's 1993 acceptance of Israel and disavowal of violence is "a crystal-clear and binding agreement" that "no Palestinian government has the authority to revoke." He added that the unity government's platform "explicitly" pledges to honor all PLO commitments.

Over dinner in a Ramallah restaurant on April 4, Fayyad told me that he offered his column simultaneously to several major American newspapers to get this story out quickly. But do his Hamas colleagues accept his reasoning? Fayyad made clear that he was not flying solo.

Just before my trip ended, the Palestinian Authority put me in touch with Shaer. On Aug. 19, when he was deputy prime minister in the all-Hamas regime, Shaer was seized in an Israeli raid of his Ramallah home and held for a month without charges or evidence.

In his ministry office a few days later, Shaer, who holds a doctorate from England's University of Manchester, looked nothing like the shirt-sleeved, tie-less man photographed when he was released in September. He was dressed in a stylish suit, but more telling than his appearance was what he said.

When I asked whether Hamas agreed with Fayyad's formulation, Shaer said it did not matter: "We are talking about the government, not groups." He said Hamas was no more relevant to Palestinian policy than the views of extremist anti-Palestinian cabinet member Avigdor Lieberman are to Israeli policy. Unexpectedly, Shaer expressed dismay that "previous attempts at peace were ruined by suicide bombers. Now, we look forward to a sustained peace."

While avoiding Israel-bashing, Shaer conjectured: "I don't think the Israeli government wants a two-state solution. Without pressure from the president of the United States, nothing is going to happen." That sounded like a plea for help from George W. Bush. But will he hear it if Elliott Abrams does not listen?

© 2007 Creators Syndicate Inc.

Why Rice will fail in the Middle East

UPDATE - April 15, 2007 - Editor's note: I am posting at the secondary blog(also see Friday's articles at the overflow blog).
---
Published: 09/04/2007 12:00 AM (UAE)

By Adel Safty, Special to Gulf News

By her own recent admission, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East contains no grand ideas and is based on the step by step approach. The step by step strategy is the wrong approach to solving the Palestine conflict. It failed before and is bound to fail again.

Rice's approach is based on the theory that if you achieve enough trust between the belligerent parties you will facilitate substantive negotiations for a final resolution of the conflict.

But the Palestine conflict is no ordinary conflict. From the beginning of the Zionist enterprise to take over Palestine from its inhabitants and turn it into a Jewish country, the Palestine conflict has been an existential one. There was no room in the Zionist project for Palestinian people in the Jewish state.

In fact, the very existence of the Palestinian people was eliminated from Palestine in the imagination of the Zionist propagandists seeking to sell their colonial enterprise to the imperial powers. Their most potent and telling slogan said that the Jewish people wanted to colonise Palestine, "a land without a people for a people without land".

A measure of the audacity of the enterprise is evident when you consider that at the time of this slogan the Arab Palestinians (Muslims and Christians) constituted about 93 per cent of the population of Palestine.

How the Zionist Commission managed, with the help of the occupying British forces, the support of the Western imperial powers, to transform Palestine by force from an Arab country into a Jewish state, is one of the most remarkable stories of the 20th century.

In the process the Palestinian people have been expelled by the hundreds of thousands, dispersed, their homeland lost, their society shattered. Those Palestinians who live under the Israeli occupation are regularly subjected to violence, collective punishment, continued dispersion and dispossession.

The Palestinians have suffered gross injustice and Israel's responsibility for this has been admitted by David Ben Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, in 1956. Various Israeli historians documented it in the past 20 years or so. And yet it is the Palestinians who are being asked to make concessions.

In 1988 they abandoned their plan for a secular state in Palestine for Jews, Muslims and Christians and agreed to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state on roughly half of Palestine. Under the Oslo Agreement, in 1993, they agreed to accept the irreversible loss of 78 per cent of their country to the Israelis and establish a mini-Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, about 22 per cent of their former country.

In fact, under various "peace" plans, the Palestinians continued to lose land and hope while at the same time being subjected to the violence of occupation and pressured into making concessions to the occupier.

Asymmetry of power

And it is this asymmetry of power that is being used by American mediators including Rice, as the defining context for "solving" the conflict. In effect, the victim is being asked to stop resisting the occupation, to protect the symbols of dispossession - the Jewish colonies - to accept punishment if they democratically elect the wrong government, and to be grateful when the daily restrictions on their lives are somewhat eased.

The step by step strategy employed by Kissinger after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war produced the Sinai I and Sinai II disengagement agreements between Israelis and Egyptians. This was in the interest of both parties. The Egyptians wanted to reopen the Suez Canal as a reward for their honourable military performance in the war. The Israelis did not want to be over-stretched militarily after the sobering lesson they received at the hands of the Egyptians. They also received a commitment from Washington not to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organisation, in effect committing Washington to block any peace with the Palestinians.

The dramatic visit by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Israel in 1977 helped produce the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement known as the Camp David Agreement in 1978. The Egyptian regained their Sinai, the Israelis removed the most powerful Arab country from the Arab-Israeli conflict and prepared to liquidate Palestinian nationalism once and for all.

This became evident when shortly after the Israelis withdrew from the Sinai in 1982, The Menahem Begin-Ariel Sharon team sent their army into Lebanon in what they hoped would be the final coup to settle the Palestine question by force. They miscalculated - with tragic cost for the Palestinians and the Lebanese.

Clearly the balance of power calculations used by Kissinger in the step by step strategy is utterly unsuitable for the Palestine conflict because of the gross asymmetry of power between the parties, one of which is undeniably a victim the other incontrovertibly a wrongdoer.

What is needed is a clear break with the past; a recognition that the Palestinians have suffered gross injustice and are entitled to reparations and a measure of justice, not as an act of charity and generosity from the occupier but as of right.

And this is what is missing from Rice's small ideas: A vision of peace based on law and justice, not force.

Instead she is focusing on power politics and small steps worthy of her small ideas. Why should the Israelis settle for anything less than what they have achieved by force when Washington is allowing them to flout "peace" plans like the roadmap, build a separation wall, and continue dispossession of the Palestinians?

In his reaction to the renewed Arab League offer of peace on the basis of some justice and some rights for the Palestinians, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmet responded confidently that his government rejected the right of return of even one Palestinian.

Prof Adel Safty is Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Novosibirsk, Russia. He is author of "From Camp David to the Gulf".

Israeli policies contravene with peace, Palestine Permanent Observer at the UN Says

Wednesday April 11, 2007 14:26 by Rami Almeghari - IMEMC&Agencies rami at imemc dot org

Palestine permanent observer at the United Nations, Mansour Mansour, warned Tuesday of continued Israeli attacks on the Palestinian people, saying such actions contravene with peace and help further feul tension on the ground.

In a letter, Mansour handed over to the chief of the security council, Mansour said that in a time many parties involving the Arab states league and the Palestinian national unity government, are exerting serious peace efforts toward potential peace, Israel violates the international humanitarian law on daily basis.

Mansour pointed out that Israel has been committing a series of extrajudicial assassinations, the latest of which was the killing of a Palestinian resident in the Jabalya refugee camp in northern Gaza, in addition to the killing of other Palestinians in the West Bank.

As for the West Bank, Mansour maintained, the Israeli forces have recently used Palestinians as human shields during house-to-house searches, reiterating underway suffering of the Palestinian people at the hands of Israeli armed settlers in the West Bank and east Jerusalem
.
The Palestinian diplomat affirmed that the continued Israeli construction of the illegal separation barrier, deep into the Palestinian territories, especially in Jerusalem, has blatantly defied the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, the relevant United Nations’ resolutions as well as the international humanitarian law.

The international court of justice issued in 2004 an advisory opinion calling for tearing down the fence-off wall and compensating those affected by its building.

The letter read that the Israeli army has been installing approximately 500 military checkpoints and roadblock across the West Bank, blocking movement of the Palestinian population and vehicles and causing ‘catastrophic economic consequences’.

Israel has been imposing a prolonged closure policy on the occupied Palestinian territories, such as the closure of Rafah crossing terminal in southern Gaza, creating a great deal of deterioration at the humanitarian level, Mansour’s letter hinted.

According to a Palestinian Authority’s report, the Israeli army has killed 6 Palestinians over the past week.

The stale myth of battlefield bravado

Related
Israel doesn't want peace: Gideon Levy - Haaretz
---
Last update - 11:22 12/04/2007

By Meron Benvenisti

Only the naive expected a positive government response to the Arab initiative offering normalized relations in return for a withdrawal and a resolution to the refugee problem. The knee-jerk skepticism to peace offers has characterized the response of nearly all Israeli governments since 1949, and not only during the years after 1967 and the occupation of the territories. When Ehud Olmert has reservations about the Arab peace initiative, he is following in the footsteps of Moshe Dayan who said half a century ago: "I am against concessions in any area, and if the Arabs will want war over this, I am not opposed."

The governments of Israel have always been quick to initiate military operations and slow to engage in restraint or seek compromise and settlement. After all, it is always possible to find justification for aggression, arguing that we were responding to their attack. The definition of provocation, compared to a response to it, is a matter of perspective. When there is an unending chain of violence and counter-violence, every cause in the eyes of one side is an effect for the other. Indeed, there are many instances in which one side initiated provocations that served as a pretext for a disproportionate response, which in turn fed the cycle.

Behind the slogans "war imposed on us" and "war of no choice" hides an old attitude that says the use of force serves strategic objectives, such as occupying territory and clutching territorial assets gained in previous wars.

There is also an ideological foundation to the aversion to peace initiatives. The governing ideology maintains that Arab hostility is a permanent situation, that the Arabs lack a basic willingness to relate to the Jewish state as a legitimate entity, and that the violent nature of the region does not allow for real peace but, in the best case scenario, a cease-fire that will be violated the very moment its enemies sense Israel's weakness.

This dismissive approach to any chance at peace stood out once again when the negative response to the Saudi peace initiative stirred nearly no protest, except among a small group of peace activists. There is even more evidence to the impact of this eternal war of the "no choice" approach: the public's anger at its leadership for failing in the supreme objective of military victory, which "will etch on the psyche of the enemy" Israel's superior deterrent power.

The urge to punish the leaders stems not only from the failures in the conduct of the war, but also from the fact that their conduct exposed the deep chasm between the fiery belligerence of arrogant generals and the lack of motivation and inability to carry out the mission, the erosion of the public's willingness to bear bereavement, and most of all, the unwillingness to give up the good life in favor of the demands of an eternal war of no choice.

The exposure of this gap is unforgiven. Because if this is the situation, how is it possible to persist with the pretense of "a war for the sake of our existence," which rejects any possibility of dialogue?

"The Lord Almighty blessed us with a miracle," the prime minister said in his apologetic speeches, "which created that which exposed the situation today and not, God forbid, in two to three years." Ehud Olmert was referring here to the growing strength of the enemy, but it would have been appropriate for him to relate to what was really exposed by the Second Lebanon War: The Israeli public has had enough of the stale myth of battlefield bravado and wishes to lead a normal life.

Something happened since the 1950s, and the public is not afraid of the privatization of defense and its transformation into an irreverent matter, empty of pathos. A daring leader will discover that it is not the conflict that is preventing normalization but the absence of normalization that is preventing an end to the conflict.

Syria, Elliot Abrams, and the Contras All Over Again

POLITICS:
Elliott Abrams and Déjà Vu All Over Again
Analysis by Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Apr 9 (IPS) - It has an all too familiar ring to it.

A crisis area -- in this case, the Middle East -- finds itself in desperate need of a peace process capable of tamping down the forces of violence and destabilisation which the United States itself has played a central role in unleashing.

Regional efforts at diplomacy -- in this case, led by Saudi Arabia -- gain some momentum but are frustrated by die-hard hawks in a U.S. administration. While increasingly on the defensive both at home and abroad, they are determined to carry through their strategy of isolating and destabilising a hostile target -- in this case, Syria -- despite its oft-repeated eagerness to engage Washington and its regional allies.

Sensing an increasingly dangerous impasse, the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives -- in this case, Nancy Pelosi, backed by a growing bipartisan consensus that the administration's intransigeance will further reduce already-waning U.S. influence in the region -- tries to encourage regional peace efforts by engaging the target directly.

But, worried that her quest might actually gain momentum, administration hawks -- in this case, led by Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams and Vice President Dick Cheney -- accuse the speaker of undermining the president and, working through obliging editorial writers at the Washington Post, among other sympathetic media, including, of course, the Wall Street Journal, attack her for "substitut(ing) her own foreign policy for that of a sitting Republican president."

If that scenario sounds familiar, your foreign policy memory dates back at least to 1987, when, despite intensified regional peace-making efforts for which Costa Rican President Oscar Arias won that year's Nobel Peace Prize, the Ronald Reagan administration was persisting in its efforts to isolate and overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

It was then-House Speaker Jim Wright who, with the quiet encouragement of Republican realists, notably Reagan's White House chief of staff, Howard Baker, Secretary of State George Shultz and his special Central America envoy, Philip Habib, sought to promote Arias' plan.

Like today's Republican realists on the Iraq Study Group (ISG), who have urged the Bush administration to engage rather than continue to isolate Syria, they understood that popular and Congressional support for a "regime change" policy in Nicaragua was not sustainable and Washington should seek a regional settlement on the most favourable terms available.

But Abrams, then assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, worked assiduously with fellow hard-liners in the White House and the Pentagon -- just as he works today with Cheney's office -- to torpedo both the Arias plan and Wright's efforts to advance it throughout the latter half of 1987.

As Abrams' assistant at the time, the future neo-conservative heavy thinker, Robert Kagan, put it later, "Arias, more than any other Latin leader single-handedly undid U.S. policy in Nicaragua." And when he won the Nobel Prize, "all us of who thought it was important to get aid for the contras reacted with disgust, unbridled disgust."

As part of their strategy, hard-liners led by Abrams rejected appeals by Nicaragua for high-level talks, thus forcing Habib to resign by late summer and insisting -- as they now do with Syria -- that direct negotiations would serve only to legitimate Sandinistas and demoralise the contras.

In November 1987, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega came to Washington with a proposal for a ceasefire with the contras. After the administration refused to receive him, Wright, seeing an opportunity to jump-start a stalled peace process, attended a meeting at the Vatican Embassy here at which Ortega asked his main domestic foe, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, to mediate between the Sandinista government and the contras.

Wright's participation in the talks was seized by Abrams as the launching pad for a public -- if barely concealed -- attack on the speaker. Interviewed by the Post under the guise of an unnamed "senior administration official," Abrams charged Wright with engaging in "guerrilla theater" and "an unbelievable melodrama" that had dealt a "serious setback" to the administration's policy.

"This was not forward movement; this was screwing up the process," the "senior official" complained to the Post which, as in its criticism Friday of Pelosi's meeting with Assad, obligingly followed up with its own editorial, entitled "What is Jim Wright Doing?", charging the speaker with having acted "as though the actual conduct of diplomacy in this delicate passage were his responsibility."

The Journal's neo-conservative editorial writers swiftly joined in, accusing Wright of a "compulsion for running off-the-shelf foreign-policy operations," just as last week they charged Pelosi and Democrats of seeking "to conduct their own independent diplomacy".

Within just a few months of his meeting with Ortega, however, the Democratic-led Congress rejected Reagan's request to fund the contras, a step which Abrams incorrectly predicted at the time would result in "the dissolution of Central America".

According to Roy Gutman's aptly named 1988 book about Reagan's Central America policy, "Banana Diplomacy", Washington soon found itself "at the margins of the region's diplomacy".

Unlike his high-public profile as assistant secretary 20 years ago, Abrams, who now presides over Middle East policy at the National Security Council, is today far more discreet, no doubt in part because his conviction in 1991 for lying to Congress about his role in the Iran-contra scandal has made him an easy target for Democrats.

"He's very careful about not leaving fingerprints," one State Department official told IPS earlier this year.

But there is little doubt among Middle East analysts here that Abrams is playing a lead role in White House efforts to discredit Pelosi for meeting with Assad, just as he did with Wright for meeting Ortega in 1987.

And just as he worked with Reagan hard-liners to undermine the Arias Plan 20 years ago, so he appears to be doing what he can to undermine recent efforts by Saudi King Abdullah to initiate an Arab-Israeli peace process and, for that matter, by Republican realists, and even Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, to push it forward.

Tricky little Rice

By Salama A Salama

---

One's puzzlement over the Arab scene intensifies each time an Arab summit is held. Last week, everyone started talking about the Arab peace initiative. The five-year-old initiative was dusted off and presented as a miracle solution. Suddenly, we are being asked to believe that full normalisation will bring about a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab land. And our leaders are solemnly calling on the Israelis to seize the opportunity. Yet there is only one thing Israel liked about the initiative: normalisation. But the Israelis played along. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, faking concern over tensions in the region, said he was willing to consider anything US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brings to the table.

For her part, Rice got her moderate Arab friends to present the initiative in a vague manner. For example, they spoke of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem rather than the right of return of refugees. And even as Arab leaders assured us that there has been no change in the initiative, the Israelis were having second thoughts. Rice met twice with Olmert and twice with Abbas and still failed to bring Olmert to discuss the question of a final settlement. The only thing the US diplomat achieved was to get Abbas and Olmert to meet every two weeks. Palestinian officials were quick to point out that nothing was likely to come out of such meetings. Olmert is not even honouring earlier promises on political and security matters.

Rice wasn't straightforward with moderate Arabs. In Aswan, she asked Arab leaders to show some flexibility. She also proposed a meeting between the International Quartet, the Arab Quartet, Israel and Palestine. But Rice has not secured Israel's commitment to start final status negotiations. Rice hasn't even succeeded in getting Israel to implement confidence- building measures approved earlier, such as the release of Palestinian monetary assets and detainees in return for the release of one captured Israeli soldier.

Olmert is refusing to discuss final status issues because, he says, Hamas is refusing to recognise Israel. Despite that, the Arabs left the door open to compromise. They will form working groups to hold international consultations with the UN Security Council, the UN and the International Quartet about the Arab initiative. The Riyadh summit was optimistic that such action would jump- start peace talks.

In short, Rice is trying to get the Arabs to recognise Israel, through normalisation, without a quid pro quo. Rice wants the Arab Quartet to meet the Quartet, then with Israel and Palestine (Syria is not invited), which amounts to an implicit recognition of Israel. But the US diplomat is not asking Israel for anything in return. Israel can build more settlements. It can engage in brutal acts against the Palestinians. And it can voice its opposition to the Arab initiative.

Oddly enough, some Arab countries were optimistic about Rice's tour. Some believed that the US diplomat was trying to fulfil Bush's promise to implement a two-state solution. But all signs indicate that the sudden interest of the US and Israel in the Arab initiative is nothing but a gimmick.

The Arabs may believe that the Arab initiative is still good and alive. But it would be a grave mistake to depend on the International Quartet. The Arab initiative is not going to get us anywhere unless Arab countries provide support to the Palestinian national unity government and make sure that Palestinian factions are not going to turn one against another in the future. The International Quartet is fully under US control. It is nothing more than a warehouse in which the US stores peace initiatives and

© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Al-Ahram Weekly Online

Wrong road to peace

Unilateral concessions have failed; different Israeli approach needed

Uzi Arad

Published: 04.04.07

On hearing the prime minister optimistically predict a peace agreement within a short timeframe, we would do well to prepare for further diplomatic flexibility on our part. Publish The two diplomatic formulas which were rejected by Sharon during his term in office - the Saudi Initiative and the Geneva Initiative – are now being renewed by Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni. If various clauses in these initiatives are adopted, they will join the series of Israeli concessions, withdrawals and flexibility of the last decade - almost all of them undertaken unilaterally and void of any benefit. In the summer of 2000, then Prime Minister Ehud Barak tried for the first time to end the conflict in one fell swoop. The concessions he presented at Camp David went far beyond anything Israel was prepared to relinquish in the past, crossing what was termed as "red lines." Yasser Arafat rejected the proposals and didn't even bother to present counter proposals. Weeks later the Palestinians embarked on the Intifada. By the end of the year, in a desperate election eve attempt in Taba, the Barak cabinet proposed further concessions beyond those offered at Camp David – all in vain. Even with the change in government and in the face of growing violence, Israel's principle positions continued to erode. In the Latroun address in 2003 Prime Minister Sharon stated that the Palestinian state is a "de facto" state. His statement led to the Quartet's Road Map that allotted three years to a peace agreement and enabled the establishment of a Palestinian state prior to that – without any parallel compensation (such as right of return for refugees to areas under Palestinian rule only.) Sharon ignored its drawbacks and preferred to highlight the fact that the first phase demanded that the Palestinians dismantle their terror infrastructure; he then forced the Road Map on his cabinet. Yet just a few months later, he deviated from the Road Map and launched the "disengagement" initiative, which comprised new concessions: Dismantling the settlement bloc and full withdrawal to the 1967 borders before reaching a final-status agreement and without receiving anything in return. Under pressure from Benjamin Netanyahu, Sharon managed to extract from the Americans several understandings relating to a future final-status agreement: American recognition that Israel is entitled to defensible borders; inclusion of the large settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty; and a declaration that Palestinian refugees would not return to Israeli territory. Leftist wishful thinking When the "disengagement" was over, its architects, including Olmert and Livni, announced similar moves in Judea and Samaria within the framework of the "realignment." Mahmoud Abbas' helplessness, the rise of Hamas to power and the Second Lebanon War delayed the plan, and we could have expected that lessons would have been drawn, but now it appears that unilateral submission is likely to continue. Since the "disengagement," dismantling of terror infrastructures is no longer a prerequisite for diplomatic talks, and Israel has come to terms with a Palestinian national unity government that includes Hamas, while it is also prepared to enter talks on a political horizon, namely, on the clauses of a final-status agreement. The renewal of the Saudi Initiative, whose key demand is withdrawal to the 1967 borders on all frontiers, also constitutes the relinquishment of understandings accepted from the time of US President Ford until George W. Bush. How did it transpire that while the Arabs and Palestinians are sticking to their guns and even increasing their demands, Israel is skipping from one initiative to another while abandoning principles and positions that were deemed crucial only yesterday? This has several explanations: According to the Leftist approach, for example, Palestinian demands are essentially justified; the Israeli occupation is the mother of all sins, and therefore, any concession or withdrawal is a blessing. Another position is the enchantment of reconciliation – the belief that aggressive and demanding parties can be placated by giving in to their demands. There's also detachment from reality - ignoring the data and situation, as presented by the intelligence forces – and wishful thinking. Mistakes were also made due to absentmindedness and weakness. Different approach needed Another common error stems from ignorance when it comes to the rules of negotiation, and primarily from misunderstanding the difficulties entailed in unilateral moves: There are no free meals and there are no free concessions. And finally, and this should not be concealed, since Taba, through to the "disengagement" and perhaps until today, the ineffective practice of concessions has been carried out for the sole purpose of political survival. Will a downfall and a series of concessions satisfy the Palestinians to such an extent that they would end the conflict and cease making further demands on us? It is doubtful whether this will happen, because historically the more Israel moderated its demands, the more the Palestinians hardened theirs. Moreover, it will not happen because unilateralism or the series of concessions were not subjected to mutual concessions, and also because Palestinians have not allowed closure in any former attempts. The incumbent Palestinian government's positions are similar to those prevalent prior to Oslo, and gradually signs of Palestinian-Israeli demands are also becoming evident and joining external ones – this does not herald the end of the conflict, but rather, the demise of the Jewish State. This is not the way to make peace. Right from the start we needed a different Israeli approach, void of the above failures and futile reconciliations. It should have focused on the advancement of Israeli interests rather than on their sacrifice.

PUSH ISRAEL? NOT DUBYA

By ROBERT D. NOVAK

April 5, 2007 -- JERUSALEM

AN overriding melancholy here this Holy Week follows Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's mission to Jerusalem the previous week. To Arabs and Jews seeking meaningful peace negotiations, it confirmed no progress toward a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians is likely for the remainder of George W. Bush's presidency.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rejected Rice's offer for her to participate in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations for a permanent peace treaty. The word in the Olmert government is that President Bush fully shares the prime minister's reluctance even to begin talks at this time.

The Riyadh Declaration indicated willingness of the Arab world to consider a peaceful solution. Now, belief here among peace-seekers is that nothing will happen until a new president enters the Oval Office in 2009.

That was the consensus Tuesday at a conference on Middle East policy held in Jerusalem by the Morley Institute of Washington:A diverse assemblage of Palestinians (Muslim and Christians), Israelis, Americans and other foreigners held little hope for a Bush initiative in the closing months of his regime.

The atmosphere has changed since I was here for Holy Week a year ago. Israeli self-confidence then was at a peak, with the newly installed Olmert avowing the unilateral solution to the Palestinian problem developed by his predecessor, Ariel Sharon.

Behind that posture was confidence in military superiority. Now the unhappy results of the Lebanon incursion have modified Israeli expectations. Olmert publicly indicates a willingness to talk, and the Haaretz newspaper quoted him as saying the Arabs' Riyadh summit "is evidence of a change."

But the moderates at Tuesday's conference viewed this as rhetoric. Olmert told Rice last week that any negotiations must be preceded by the release of the Israeli soldier seized by Hamas fighters last June 25.

The broader pre-conditions for talks are Olmert's refusals to include in negotiations any discussion of a return of Arab refugees to greater Palestine and a withdrawal of Israel to its 1967 borders. Negotiating those points does not mean that they will be conceded. But setting pre-conditions for talks is a classic mechanism for escaping talks altogether.

Indeed, Olmert continues to cite the presence of Hamas in the Palestinian government as justification for the absence of anybody from the negotiating table.

It surely is up to Bush. When Rice made her previous visit to Israel about six weeks ago, the Israeli government announced that Olmert had been on the phone with Bush a day earlier and that they "see eye-to-eye." That insured the three-cornered talks in Jerusalem between Rice, Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas would accomplish nothing substantial.

Haaretz political columnist Akiva Eldar, a speaker at Tuesday's conference, wrote in Monday's newspaper: "As a rare and historic opportunity appears on the horizon, a leadership of different dimensions is needed." He was talking about Olmert, but he could have referred to Bush as well.

Nothing could be accomplished now without Bush pressuring Olmert. Bush's original intentions to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace were sidetracked by the 9/11 attack and subsequent U.S. military operations. The question is whether Eldar's "historic opportunity" will be gone when a new American president takes office.

No more Arab capitulation

---

Israel had finally given its conditional assent to the Arab peace initiative launched in Beirut in 2002. Ahead of his meeting with Palestinian President Abbas on 11 March, Israel's Prime Minister Olmert said that he "approved of regional negotiations on the basis of the Arab peace initiative," noting that Israel was willing to respond to that initiative, especially the positive aspects it contained. The Israeli foreign minister then advised Arab countries not to wait for peace to normalise relations with Israel, but to act sooner. Meanwhile, reports indicated that Israel demanded limited amendments in the initiative, especially with regard to the matters of borders and refugees. During her tour of the region, Condoleezza Rice hinted in the same direction.

It is hard to fathom this rapid change of heart on Israel's side. But we known that Israel, along with the US, are in the habit of engaging in such manoeuvres whenever an Arab summit is about to convene. The aim is always the same: to distract Arab leaders from the real issues at hand. In this case, Israel's aim was to prevent the summit from taking a strong anti-Israeli line. And America did the same, arranging for the Baghdad summit to be held on 10 March, a fortnight or so before the summit. The US wanted the Baghdad conference to launch a new regional policy that may bring about a solution to the Iraqi crisis. The conference, therefore, was timed to prevent the Arab summit from taking a hard-line stance on Iraq.

The Israeli move is nothing more than a diversion tactic. Israel's prime minister speaks of the "positive aspects" of the Arab initiative but his real aim is to speak of the aspects he wouldn't agree to. This is quite predictable, for Israel is unwilling to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the refugee problem. As for Livni's call for normalisation before talks, this is a non-starter. What Israel wants is for the Arabs to strip their initiative of content, to turn it into the "Tel Aviv initiative". Israel wants the Arabs to normalise their relations with Israel as a gesture of goodwill. Then and only then, it would engage in talks that may or may not lead to results.

Israel wants an Arab capitulation. It saw how the Arabs changed their position in the past and hopes for much the same again. Before 1967, the Arabs saw Israel as an imperialist state. After 1967, they accepted a two-state solution. Then the Arabs offered full normalisation to sweeten the deal. Now Israel wants more.

The Arab peace initiative is not a starting point for negotiations. Its wording is too clear to allow for further talks. The Arabs didn't fashion their initiative in ambiguous language that allows for give and take. Instead, they said exactly what they meant. The problem is that the initiative offers Israel not the least that the Arabs can accept, but the most they can do. This is what makes this initiative a poor starting point for negotiations. What more can the Arabs offer?

The Arabs should not alter their peace initiative. More importantly, they should admit that Israel is not in the mood to accept the Beirut initiative or even negotiate on its basis. All Israel wants is to disrupt the Riyadh summit. All it wants is for the Arabs to make more concessions. The Arabs should ignore what Israel is saying about amending the initiative. The Arabs should tilt the balance of power in their favour. The Arabs need to establish parity, not just with Israel, but also with all those who want to control their fate.

© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Al-Ahram Weekly Online

Israeli Vice Premier Peres calls for direct Arab-Israeli talks

Last update - 19:53 29/03/2007

Report: Peres calls for direct Arab-Israeli talks

By Avi Issacharoff , Haaretz Correspondent, and Reuters

Israel hold direct talks on peace with Arab states, Vice Premier Shimon Peres said Thursday after Arab leaders renewed a peace offer first drafted by Saudi Arabia in 2002.

"Let's sit together as we are supposed to and work on it as we did before with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians," he told Al Jazeera television in remarks dubbed in Arabic, but he did not say if Israel accepts or rejects the Arab bid.

The plan, parts of which have been rejected by Israel, offers normal ties with all Arab countries in return for Israel's withdrawal from land occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War, the creation of a Palestinian state and a "just solution" for Palestinians displaced in 1948.

"It is time now to start negotiating and not only to make announcements," Peres said. "We should think about the tactics [for peace] and how to implement them," he said.

"We either do this [peace steps] unilaterally or bilaterally. If you do that unilaterally then you are making a declaration but bilaterally there would be an Arab stance and an Israeli stance and these will include some difference," he said.

Peres said no conditions should be set for the envisaged Arab-Israeli negotiations.

"We propose that we meet without setting pre-conditions and negotiate," he said. "We also want comprehensive peace that tackles all of the stagnant issues," he said.

"Yes there are some differences about the refugees and Jerusalem so we should sit together and solve this issue there is no other way."

Peres did not make a direct stance on the initiative but said: "We respect Arab countries and this conference [summit] ..."

U.S. welcomes Arab endorsement of peace plan
The United States welcomed Arab leaders' endorsement of the 5-year-old peace initiative intended to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, calling it was a "very postive" step.

"That is something that we view as very positive," said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack when asked about the outcome of the Arab summit and endorsement of the 2002 plan drawn up at a previous summit in Beirut.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pressed Arab leaders during a visit to the region over the past week to follow up on the Arab plan and use it as the basis to engage with the Israelis.

Despite Israeli reservations, Rice said she had not asked Arab leaders to amend the plan.

"We encourage them, however, to use it as a point of active diplomacy and as a way of energizing the push for peace in the Middle East. Their efforts and those of others have an important role to play," said McCormack.

McCormack declined further comment on the summit's endorsement of the plan until he had more details but said Rice wanted Arab states to play a more active role in encouraging peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Abbas warns of violence if Israel rejects peace plan
Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas warned on Thursday of violence if Israel rejected a Palestinian "hand of peace," and called for an international conference on achieving peace.

"I reiterate the sincerity of the Palestinian will in extending the hand of peace to the Israeli people... We should not waste more chances in the history of this long and painful cause," he told the closing ceremony of an Arab summit.

"The entire region will be under renewed threats of war, explosions, as well as regional and international confrontations, as a result of the absence of a solution or the impossibility of implementing one," Abbas added.

"We hope our summit would result in the formation of an Arab committee headed by the Saudi Arabian monarchy, the head of the summit, to follow up implementation of the Arab initiative," he said, referring to an Arab land-for-peace proposal.

He called for a "negotiated settlement that will be sponsored by the international community and within the framework of an international peace conference in the region."

Arabs approve Arab peace plan
Arab leaders gathering for a two-day summit in Saudi Arabia on Wednesday unanimously approved the Saudi peace initiative originally launched in 2002.

Abbas voted in favor of the initiative, although Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas abstained in the vote.

At the summit, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah called for an end to the international blockade on the Palestinian government. The king said: "It has become necessary to end the unjust blockade imposed on the Palestinian people as soon as possible so the peace process can proceed."

The European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, on Wednesday urged Arab states to be flexible in their land-for-peace offer to Israel. Addressing the Arab summit, Solana called for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 boundaries.

He called the Arab initiative a general concept that has to be developed. He also urged Arabs and Israel to deal with the plan as a starting point in negotiations.

In a written message to the Arab leaders gathered in Riyadh, Solana said the EU hopes all the members of the Arab League will fulfill their responsibilities and contribute to the success of this enterprise. "Failure to rise to today's challenges will put the Middle East at risk of missing the train of human and economic development," he said in the message.

Before arriving in Riyadh, Solana expressed optimism that the relaunched initiative could reinvigorate the Middle East peace process. Solana's presence at the summit was designed to highlight the European Union's support for the peace initiative, officials said.

Saudis: Rejection of Arab plan is rejection of peace
If Israel rejects the Arab peace initiative, it means it is not interested in reaching a peaceful solution with its neighbors, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said Wednesday. Speaking at the summit, al-Faisal said, "If Israel refuses, that means it doesn't want peace."

Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh urged Arab leaders not to compromise on the Palestinian refugees' right to return to their homes in Israel, a clause in the initiative which Israel has asked to modify. "I expect the Arab summit meeting to reiterate the Arab countries' commitment not to compromise on the Palestinian refugees right of return," Haniyeh said.

At the summit, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Arab leaders to prove they were serious about peace with Israel by reviving their five-year-old initiative.

"The Arab peace initiative is one of the pillars for the peace process... This initiative sends a signal that the Arabs are serious about achieving peace," Ban told Arab leaders.

"When I was in Israel I urged my Israeli friends to take a new look at the initiative. Here in Riyadh, I also urge you, my Arab friends, to benefit from this initiative and reiterate your commitment to it," he said.

At the summit, Arab League chief Amr Moussa urged Israel to accept the initiative rather than ask for changes. "The Israeli response was to ask for an amendment. We tell them to accept it first," Moussa told Arab leaders. "We are at a crossroads - either we move toward a real peace or see an escalation in the situation."

Arab experts cautious over Rice's peace moves

Middle East News
ANALYSIS

By Abdul Jalil Mustafa Mar 25, 2007, 15:03 GMT

Amman - US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice may be carrying proposals for pushing forward the Arab-Israeli peace process, but governments of the region should avoid 'excessive optimism' as to the outcome of the new US round of diplomacy, Arab politicians and analysts said Sunday.

'We have to avoid excessive optimism regarding what may come out of Rice's new tour,' Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee at Jordan's lower house of parliament, Mohammad Abu Hudaib, told Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa.

'However, we do believe that the Arabs can put pressure on the United States to do something at this juncture, because Washington is in a state of crisis in Iraq and, therefore, it needs their help to come out of this plight,' he said.

Abu Hudaib considered Israeli and US attitudes towards the newly- forged Palestinian coalition government as 'non-reassuring.'

He alluded to Israel's avowed refusal to deal with the new Palestinian cabinet and Washington's declaration that it would only deal with the non-Hamas ministers.

The US Secretary of State met on Saturday in the Egyptian city of Aswan with foreign ministers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which form the pillars of the so-called moderate Arab camp.

Addressing a press conference earlier Sunday, Rice sidestepped a question about the nature of moves the United States intended to carry out to push forward the Middle East peace process.

But she said it would try to develop a 'common ground' between the Palestinians and Israelis for implementing the quartet's roadmap.

An address delivered by Jordan's King Abdullah II before the US Congress on March 8 appeared to be the catalyst for Rice's new Middle East tour, Arab diplomats said.

The monarch urged the United States to play a 'historic role' toward the conclusion of a Palestinian-Israeli peaceful settlement, warning all parties will be 'at risk' should a solution leading to the setting up of an independent Palestinian state not materialize.

'His Majesty's address was designed to alert the US legislators to the fact that the Palestinian question, which represents the core of all conflicts in the region, should be given priority over the situation in Iraq,' Abu Hudaib said.

The Aswan meeting comes ahead of the Arab summit conference scheduled for Wednesday in Riyadh, where Arab leaders are expected to re-launch the Arab Peace Initiative that was adopted for the first time by the Arab summit in Beirut in 2002.

Israeli leaders have demanded an amendment of the Arab blueprint, and Arab editorialists and commentators expected Rice to exercise pressure on Arab leaders to introduce certain changes into the Arab peace plan at the Riyadh summit.

'I don't believe Arab leaders will accept any pressure to change the Arab initiative,' Abu Hudaib said, citing the 'difficult situation' faced by the US administration due to pressure by the Congress to pull out from Iraq.

The Arab peace plan envisages extending recognition to Israel by all Arab states only after it pulls out from all Arab territories it occupied in the 1967 Six Day War, including East Jerusalem.

Israel however wants to normalize ties with Arab countries before committing itself to any territorial concessions.

Taher Adwan, editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper al-Arab al- Yawm, also indicated his belief that Arab leaders would reject any US pressures to change the Arab initiative.

'Washington used to put pressure on Arab leaders ahead of any new summit, but there are precedents where Arab summits did not respond to such dictations,' he said.

Adwan discerned a 'different US attitude this time, as far as the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is concerned.'

'However, Rice's visit to the region ahead of the Riyadh summit gives the conference added significance and should prompt Arab leaders to adopt strong positions that affect the US agenda and force it to change course in the right direction,' he said.

One of the impressions widely perceived in the Arab world is that the US secretary of state will be seeking support for the West's standoff with Iran over the nuclear issue.

'I cannot exclude this as part of the US manoeuvre, but any prudent politician must come to the conclusion that any war against Iran will be catastrophic for the entire region,' Abu Hudaib said.

© 2007 dpa - Deutsche Presse-Agentur

Israel "not interested" in peace process

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 10:20:44

Palestinian Deputy Prime Minister Azzam Al Ahmed has said Israel is not interested in reviving the peace process or implementing its obligations.

Referring to the Israeli government's decision to boycott the new Palestinian government, Al Ahmed said, "This was not unexpected as the Israelis did not approve of the Mecca deal before the formation of the unity government. The Israelis have consistently expressed a negative attitude," Palestine News Network reported.

He said it is a continuation of the regime's hawkish policy that began years ago with the siege imposed on the late Authority Chief Yasir Arafat using the same pretext that there is “no Palestinian partner.”

Meanwhile, Palestine's deputy PM described the first meeting of the eleventh government as “positive and responsible.”

The meeting was led by Authority Chief Mahmoud Abbas from the presidential offices via video conference between Ramallah and Gaza City on Sunday.

In the session, Abbas stressed the need for the new government to meet the needs of the entire Palestinian population, not one party over another.

MM/BG

Israeli Troops Raid Nablus, Start Curfew

Sunday February 25, 2007 12:01 PM

By ALI DARAGHMEH

Associated Press Writer

NABLUS, West Bank (AP) - Dozens of Israeli jeeps and armored vehicles poured into Nablus overnight Sunday, placing large areas of the city under curfew and conducting house-to-house arrest raids in one of the largest West Bank military operations in months.

The army also took over local television and radio stations, ordering people to remain indoors and warning residents that the clampdown would remain in effect for several days, Palestinian residents said. Two soldiers and several Palestinians were lightly wounded in clashes, officials said.

An Israeli military spokesman said the operation was aimed at countering ``terrorist threats'' in Nablus. The raid came a day after Israeli troops discovered an explosives laboratory in the city. Nablus, the West Bank's largest city and commercial center, is known as a stronghold of Palestinian militants.

Palestinian officials condemned the raid, saying it threatened President Mahmoud Abbas' efforts to restart peace talks with Israel.

Abbas held a rare meeting last week with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Although little progress was made at the meeting, participants said they discussed the possibility of extending a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.

``We condemn this military incursion,'' said Saeb Erekat, a confidant to Abbas. ``This will undermine the efforts that are being made to sustain the cease-fire with Israel.''

The Israeli forces began moving into Nablus about 3 a.m. and continued to move in for several hours, Palestinian witnesses said. They said about 80 military vehicles, along with several bulldozers, were in the city.

The bulldozers erected huge piles of rubble to block movement on main roads, witnesses said. The main entrance to the city also was closed.

The operation was focused on Nablus' Old City, or casbah, a densely populated area of narrow alleyways, apartment buildings and markets. About 50,000 people were placed under curfew, residents said.

Soldiers moved from door to door, entering homes in search of suspects.

At one point, nervous soldiers forced a Palestinian youth to lead a small group of soldiers up some stairs and into a home ahead of the forces. The soldiers then took the youth, along with several young Palestinian men, into a military vehicle. A group of young boys peeked out from the window of a neighboring building.

Israel's Supreme Court in 2005 banned the practice of using Palestinian civilians as ``human shields,'' though the army challenged the decision. The army had no immediate comment on Sunday's incident, which was filmed by AP Television News.

While the operation largely shut down Nablus, sporadic clashes were reported. Soldiers were pelted with stones and cement blocks, and exchanged fire with Palestinian gunmen, the army said, adding that two soldiers were lightly wounded by a Palestinian bomb.

The army responded to the protests with rubber bullets and stun grenades, witnesses said. In one incident, soldiers entered a cemetery to search for Palestinians who had pelted their vehicle with stones.

Palestinian medical officials said four Palestinians were wounded by rubber bullets during Sunday's unrest.

The raid came at a sensitive time for Abbas, a political moderate who is trying to cobble together a unity government with the radical Hamas movement.

Hamas and Abbas' Fatah party reached a power-sharing deal earlier this month in the Muslim holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, though a new government has not yet been formed.

Abbas says the arrangement has forced Hamas to moderate its violently anti-Israel ideology and should pave the way for the lifting of international sanctions imposed on the current Hamas-led government.

Israel and Western donor nations have not yet made a decision on lifting the sanctions, but they have warned the agreement falls short of international demands to renounce violence and recognize Israel's right to exist.

In the Gaza Strip, Hamas officials said the Israeli raid was undermining the Palestinian unity efforts.

``We question why these military campaigns are increasing now,'' said Ghazi Hamad, spokesman for the Hamas-led government. ``This indicates the Israeli government is trying to turn what was agreed upon in Mecca into a failure.''

Does America Want a Real Peace Process?

Feb 17, 2006

By Eugene Bird
Eugene Bird served as US ambassador to various Middle East capitals.


The unreal testimony given by three members of the Israel Lobby before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia the House Committee on Foreign Affairs indicates that we have a long way to go before Congress, under the new Democratic majority, is able to shed its anti-Palestinian robes.

The lengthy hearing called by the subcommittee chairman Gary Ackerman (D-NY) could properly be described as a Valentine Day massacre of peace in the Middle East.

The Administration and even many members of Congress seem aware that the problem that Israel poses to the reputation of the United States throughout the world demands some immediate attention. Will it get that attention? The subcommittee hearing indicates otherwise.

Many organizations and individuals had asked the chairman to balance the Lobby witnesses with reasonably objective academics or activists on the peace process. The Palestine Center’s Fellow Michael Brown, citing the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, suggested that there were a number of real experts on the Middle East including Naseer Aruri, Phyllis Bennis, Nadia Hijab, Rashid Khalidi, Saree Makdisi, and Joseph Massad.

He might also have included Henry Siegman of the Council on Foreign Relations who recently commented that the Saudi initiative to successfully negotiate a coalition government for the Palestinians was a very positive development and one that might persuade the European Union to undertake its own initiative.

However, at the subcommittee hearing on February 14th, David Makovsky from the AIPAC-backed Washington Institute for Near East Policy attacked the Saudis as having undermined Secretary Rice's idea of "political horizon" - the State Department's en vogue term that has become a major supplement to "the roadmap" - that she will promote on President's Day in Jerusalem. It is hard even to guess what she will say to President Mahmoud Abbas. Nor will she be able to offer him any additional aid, even for security purposes. The subcommittee hearing made clear that even the 87 million dollars already pledged was in jeopardy as a result of the new Palestinian coalition government.

The subcommittee has promised to have further hearings on the Middle East and the Israel-Palestine issue with the implicit promise that some actual, real Palestinians might be invited to testify for only the second time in 15 years. Everyone should be alerted and come down hard on the members of the subcommittee to see to it that this promise is fulfilled and that a fair hearing is held. Ackerman, the highly pro-Israel chairman, did ask a surprisingly frank question of the three witnesses, which also included former Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk and the somewhat ridiculous academic Daniel Pipes. Ackerman said that the testimony had been very depressing with little or no optimism about where negotiations could go. What, he asked, did they have in mind for getting out of this situation, inferring that both the U.S. and Israel were in deep trouble. There was no real response to this question, except to insist that Hamas recognize Israel and foreswear violence.

Secretary Rice announced that she would be visiting with some representatives from the Arab states in Amman before going to Berlin next Wednesday for a meeting of the Quartet to brief them on her trip. It is a fair guess that there will be a representative from Saudi Arabia at the meeting in Amman, and officials around Secretary Rice have indicated that she would be seeking support for Prime Minister Olmert. The inference was that Saudi Arabia , in particular, might be asked to continue her backchannel efforts with Israel . Any attempt by the United States to encourage Saudi recognition of Israel is almost certainly bound to backfire.

However, there is a halfway house for recognition.

In exchange for a somewhat vague de facto recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia, the United States could end financial sanctions on the new government of Palestine and perhaps Prime Minister Olmert could be asked to include the Arab League in negotiations. This may look unrealistic and perhaps even foolish to the foreign policy establishment in Washington, but stranger things have happened in Middle East negotiations. The Bush administration very much needs a success in dealing with the Middle East, particularly Israel and Palestine.


Eugene Bird is the founder of the Council for the National Interest (CNI) and served as the US ambassador to various Middle East capitals.